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ORGAN OF THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE
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Appears simultaneously in
English, Russian, French
and German

Publishing Office :

Leningrad, Smolny, 63. Tel. 1.19.

Editor's Office :

Leningrad, Smolny, Zinoviev's Cabinet

Published at 16 King Street, Covent Garden, London, W.C.2.

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Results of the Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I.

Stabilisation of Capitalism and the Lull in the Political Situation.

THE stabilisation of capitalism was the main subject at the Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International, and the centre of all the political debates. It should be borne in mind that this problem had neither been elaborated nor prepared by the various sections of the Comintern.

As in the past, we still fail to give sufficient attention to the most important economic questions. We do not study enough the various processes taking place in the world economic system, and are still too much inclined to solve the most complicated tasks of class struggle on the basis of mere political intuition. The question of the stabilisation of capitalism has been in the main for many of us empirically the result of the political lull experienced by the Labour movement in the West. However, the problem of the stabilisation of capitalism cannot be entirely judged from this pessimist viewpoint engendered by the temporary political lull. The stabilisation of capitalism pre-supposes undoubtedly a political lull, but this political lull itself does not by any means solve in advance the question of the durability and intensity of economic stabilisation. For instance, according to the logic of the Czech comrades—the once revolutionary situation which prevailed in Germany in 1923 no longer exists, the phase of “revolutionary romanticism” should be brought to an end, and the advent of an epoch of “super-imperialism” in world economics should be recognised. Is it correct to treat the question from this standpoint? The fact is that this international stabilisation of the capitalist order did not prevent revolutionary events in Russia, Turkey, China and in other countries.

On the other hand, the disintegration of capitalist economy may be slow, it may take the form of a prolonged process during which the economic situation can alternately improve or grow worse. In this process there can be temporary interruptions and intervals which will in their turn

affect the correlation of class forces and impede the development of revolutionary events. The seven years which have passed since the end of the European wars have given us many convincing examples in this respect. After the war a number of European countries were shaken to their foundations economically, but nevertheless, only Central Europe became the theatre of a really revolutionary situation. If we take once more the experiences of the revolutionary period of 1830-1848, we are compelled to admit that the parallelism of revolutions and economic catastrophes is not in the nature of an irrevocable mathematical rule. Here it is by no means a question of separating "politics" from "economics," but merely a question of not vulgarising Marxism and not bringing complicated political phenomena mechanically into one common scheme. Whilst it is absolutely correct that in the long run the development of political events is determined by economics, the history of revolutions at the same time teaches us that class differences can become very acute either before or after the economic crisis has reached its culminating point, owing to a whole number of other causes.

Civil War and Class Struggle.

After a careful study of the present situation we can say most emphatically that the class struggle does not at present take the form of open civil war, as was the case in Russia in 1917, and in Germany in 1918-1919. Civil war pre-supposes an objective revolutionary situation which does not exist now in the West. There is above all no revolutionary situation just in that country which only recently was the centre of the revolutionary movement of Western Europe, namely Germany. Here we at present witness a political lull. But it would be erroneous and premature to ascribe an international character to this situation and to apply it unreservedly to other countries. One cannot come to the conclusion from the example of one country—which, it is true, is of great international importance being so to speak the ground where the contradictions of world economics and politics are most acute—that we will be confronted on an international scale with a phase similar to that through which Europe passed after the revolution of 1848 or after the Paris Commune in 1871. These attempts to make Germany the point of departure for an estimation of the entire international situation show how "continentally" limited is our political experience, and how little attention we pay to the general situation outside the European continent. In

order to maintain the right perspective one must take into account such phenomena as the colonial movement, which is of paramount importance in the imperialist epoch. The establishment of a united front between the Soviet Union and the Eastern and colonial peoples fighting for their emancipation is by no means a political phantom which we offer as a kind of consolation to those Communist Parties which have no longer revolutionary perspectives in the West in the near future. It is as yet very difficult to say if the prelude to another revolutionary outburst will be another world war or a rising in the colonies, or, what is more probable, the one and the other simultaneously. But we would certainly be doctrinaires and not revolutionaries if we were to construct one immutable revolutionary plan whose whole *raison d'être* was the European continent. Lenin in his polemics with members of the German Spartacus Bund, and especially with Rosa Luxemburg, as far back as in 1916, foresaw in circumstances that are well known, the possibility of national wars even in Europe itself, not to mention the colonies. He wrote at that time :

"During the epoch of imperialism, national wars on the part of colonies and semi-colonies are not only probable, but inevitable. The colonies and semi-colonies (China, Turkey, Persia), are inhabited by up to 1,000 million people, *i.e.*, more than half the population of the world. Here the national liberation movements even now are either very strong or are developing and maturing. A national liberation war, an alliance, for instance of Persia, India and China against some of the imperialist Powers is quite possible, and even probable, for it would be the natural outcome of the national liberation movement of these countries. **Moreover the transformation of such a war into an Imperialist war between the present Imperialist powers will depend on a considerable number of concrete circumstances.**"

And then again :

"Such wars are progressive and revolutionary, although, of course, if they are to be successful they require either the combined efforts of an enormous number of inhabitants of the oppressed countries, a particularly favourable combination of circumstances in the international situation, or a simultaneous rising of the proletariat of one of the big powers against the bourgeoisie."

With Lenin "the rising of the proletariat of one of the big powers," a colonial war against the oppressors and

finally another armed conflict between the imperialist robbers—all these possibilities formed a component part of his foresight of the destinies of world revolution.

Moreover, one cannot have a correct perspective without taking into consideration the contradictions which are rending the whole capitalist world. The rivalry between America and Great Britain is the main trend of these contradictions along which the forthcoming world conflict will develop. Just as the war of 1914-1918, in spite of the fact that the interests of various states were involved, was in the main a struggle between Great Britain and Germany for economic hegemony, so in the future war Anglo-American rivalry will be a decisive factor of world importance. The "minor" satellites of these two giants will be drawn into the orbit of struggle and will be engulfed in the general catastrophe. The struggle for oil, for the preservation of the mighty British Empire with its colonies and dominions, the struggle for the world market, the railways and sea routes—such is the idyll of the political stabilisation that an "economically stabilised" Europe opens up for us.

In the whirlpool of these contradictions Germany as the object of the colonial exploitation of Central Europe, will play one of the most decisive parts in preparing, developing and perhaps even in accelerating this conflict. It is just on this point that the clash between American, British and French interests is most apparent.

America is interested in the normalisation of Germany, as this is the only way to guarantee American investments in that country against any risk of loss. No sensible Yankee will think of placing his surplus cash into the smoking crater of a Vesuvius. Yankees want a Dawesised, namely, a non-revolutionary Germany, a Germany with a stable valuta and with safe dividends. On the other hand, France, in order to escape inflation and to create more or less normal conditions for the development of French capitalism, looks upon the entire problem of the stabilisation of Europe from the viewpoint of a fleecer determined to bleed dry the famished German workers. In order to fulfil the Dawes obligations, Germany must throw on to the world market new quantities of cheap manufactured articles, displacing British industries step by step everywhere. Therefore, the interests of British capitalism are flagrantly out of keeping with the reparation plans and appetites of the French imperialists. In its present stage, the Dawes Plan is nothing but a hopeless attempt to reconcile for a

time the mutually contradictory tendencies of the world policy. These differences make themselves felt everywhere; in all colonial countries where the spheres of influence of the Big Powers come dangerously close together.

Under such conditions, can one assert that the defeat of the working class is of a more or less permanent character, calculated in decades, that we have entered the epoch of "ultra-imperialism," in which the proletariat is doomed to make peace all along the line with the triumphant imperialists swine?

We think that there is no foundation for such an assertion, all the more so as this would mean that when making decisions on the prospect of the movement, one would have to eliminate from political calculations that which is really the "soul" of this movement, namely, the class struggle of the proletariat which is at present the most decisive factor in every correct perspective. The perspective of development without the element of class struggle is not a perspective for the revolutionary party of the proletariat. Bolshevism has nothing in common with historic fatalism.

1907—1925.

In Russia, the present period in Western Europe is frequently compared with the revolutionary interval which took place in Russia after 1907. Such a parallel may no doubt have its justification, but like every historic parallel, it can only be accepted with reservations.

It is a well known fact that in Russia after 1907, during the Stolypin regime, the revolutionary perspective was based on the inability of the old regime to solve the agrarian question properly. In the Russian Revolution of 1905-06, and subsequently in 1907, the peasant question was the backbone of the entire revolutionary movement. Matters are different now in Europe. Within the complicated framework of capitalist contradictions, the Dawes Plan is the central point. In estimating the fate and prospects of the European revolution in 1925, it plays the same role as the peasant problem in Russia after the revolution of 1905-06. And this fact that the revolutionary perspective in Europe is connected with the success or non-success of the Dawes Plan, gives this perspective a decidedly international character. The immediate fate not only of the German revolution, but also of the entire international revolutionary movement depends on

the issue of the Dawes Plan. The defeat which we suffered in Central Europe, and particularly in Germany in 1923, has more serious international consequences than the failure of the Russian Revolution in 1905. One cannot be blind to this fact. At the same time one should not leave out of account the characteristically peculiar features of the "present situation" in Germany which distinguishes it from the situation in our country in 1907. But in spite of this difference, one is compelled to admit, that Germany is just the country whose position more than that of any other countries reminds one of our position in 1907. Does this mean that we must expect the transference of the centre of the revolutionary movement to other countries? Although the German proletariat has suffered defeat it is not entirely beaten. At the same time the German proletariat which has gone through the remarkable experience of its five years-long revolution (1918-23), and which is under the yoke of a two-fold exploitation of general capitalist exploitation on the one hand, and of exploitation of a colonial character on the other hand, will at the first flaw in the Dawes Plan inevitably revolutionise itself much more rapidly than the workers of other countries. In our opinion, the key to the revolution in Europe will be in Germany after all. This might seem paradoxical considering our temporary losses in Germany, and especially considering the successes achieved by the Communist movement in other countries, particularly in France. Nevertheless, such a perspective seems to us the most probable of all. The German bourgeoisie is now living on the credits granted it; it is enjoying the "springtide" of the Dawes Plan, and its autumn will come a little later when the German workers will have to bear the cost of the stabilisation of world capitalism at the expense of their own production and at the expense of the German credit balances. What is happening now in Austria in connection with "rehabilitation" can also happen to the German proletariat. In a more or less short period of time we will witness in Germany acute class conflicts arising out of the necessity for self-defence on the part of the working class against the conditions of imprisonment and repressions that are the result of the Dawes Plan. For this reason we are of the opinion that it is too soon to bury the German revolution in spite of the temporary lull in the revolutionary movement in Germany.

The state of the revolutionary movement in other countries differs from 1907 much more than in Germany. Here the symptoms are of a different nature, showing the Labour movement to be rather on an upward grade than a decline.

We have in mind above all the steps forward now being made in the British Labour movement. Outwardly, British imperialism is still firmly established. It still dreams of world domination, but inwardly it is being corroded and undermined by grave maladies. In the epoch of imperialism, Great Britain represents just such a conglomérat of nations as Austria-Hungary did in the system of European States previous to 1914. But the situation in Great Britain is still more complicated as the British Empire has to do not only with one race, but with a multiplicity of tribes all doing their utmost to throw off British domination. In the first place British imperialism is torn asunder by the colonial movements, and in the second place by the centrifugal tendencies of the British dominions. The historic change now maturing in the British Labour movement and which is an entirely new page in its history, owes its development to the fact that Great Britain has lost its monopolist position in the world market.

And then again, it would be different to find an analogy between the present financial crisis in France and the position in Russia in 1907. France is at present confronted with the menace of another inflation. The French bourgeoisie, following the example of the German bourgeoisie, expects through the depreciation of the currency to rob the workers and lower middle class of France, transferring all the burdens of military losses and expenses on to their shoulders. For the first time the French petty bourgeoisie and peasantry are beginning to realise that they have lost the war. The barometer registering the mood of these masses is rising rapidly, and this atmosphere of excitement cannot but have an influence on the whole spirit of the Labour movement in France. The government of the late MacDonald and Herriot intended using the Dawes Plan as a pall with which to cover the coffin of the German revolution. But in reality they let loose in their countries forces with which world reaction will have to reckon seriously.

In spite of Germany's enormous international importance, we have to adopt with a number of countries other tactics than were used in the Russian Revolution of 1905-06, and this is why we cannot draw a strict analogy between 1907 and 1925. Revolutionary tactics cannot be an abstract plan. They are based on a correct appreciation of the correlation of forces in every separate country. We must remember that the present world Labour movement presents a variegated picture as far as its level of class consciousness, the degree of its organisation and its power of resist-

ance to the pressure of the capitalists are concerned. This state of affairs is still more complicated owing to the fact that the various countries are in different stages of economic preparedness or maturity for the realisation of Socialism. This being so, it would be a very dangerous experiment to endeavour to stereotype the entire world movement. We must, therefore, avoid this in our estimation of the state of the world Labour movement. In classifying our entire world movement, we might divide it according to several types : (a) first of all there is America which has every chance of assuming hegemony over the world market, where capitalism is still very firmly established, and where the workers in comparison with the European proletariat represent a kind of labour aristocracy, nourished by the enormous surplus profits of the American bourgeoisie. Here the Communist movement far from being at the level of 1907, is not even at the level of our pre-revolutionary years of 1900. There is no doubt whatever, that in such countries where capitalism is so highly developed the revolutionising of the proletariat will proceed with catastrophic rapidity, provided there be an objective revolutionary situation. But nevertheless, the incontrovertible fact remains that in America we have not yet even a 1907 with the past experience of a lost revolution. (b) Then we have countries where the capitalist industrial apparatus has received a shock, whilst outwardly preserving a favourable appearance : these are Great Britain and France. The Labour and Communist movement in these countries is of a very peculiar type, which also does not lend itself to comparison with 1907. We have only to cite the example of the famous "bloodless revolution" by parliamentary means, to realise that we have here a peculiar zig-zag in the movement which could hardly be compared with any Russian period of the movement. Our workers were cured of their illusions by the blood bath on January 9th, 1905, whilst the British proletariat goes through this process in its own peculiar manner, and this the Russian proletariat finds difficult to understand at times.

More than 50 years ago, the French proletariat went through the greatest experience of the first Socialist revolution in the world—the Paris Commune. This was half a century in advance of our October Revolution. It would, therefore, hardly be expedient to draw an analogy between these peculiar zigzags of the Labour movement and the development of revolutionary events in Russia. (c) Where our Russian comparisons would not err on the side of great historical stretching of points, would certainly be in Germany and in that part of Europe which was defeated in the

recent war. Here our European comrades have every reason for making use of our rich experience of 1907-14, for the benefit of the movement in their own countries. (d) Finally, there is the Eastern portion of Europe with the buffer States and the Balkans. With their social structure and the acuteness of the national struggles within them, these countries remind one by the tempo of their movement of Russia in the pre-revolutionary years and on the eve of the European war. Those who know what acute form the agrarian and national questions are assuming here and how virulent is the strife between the governmental cliques and the toiling masses will hardly insist that a 1907 period has come in this part of Europe.

Is it Possible to make a Partial Revolutionary Breach in the Imperialist Front?

In thus characterising the level of the movement in the various countries, we are brought to a question which is of enormous practical importance, namely, that of the possibility of effecting a partial breach in the imperialist front. Can a workers' revolution in one separate country be thought of under the present conditions of capitalist environment, or would such a revolution be in the nature of a revolutionary adventure? Many of our European comrades under the influence of the recent failures in Estonia and Bulgaria are inclined to connect the possibility of a successful revolutionary movement in separate countries with the general collapse of the capitalist order. They adopt such a collapse to the epoch of another European war. There is no doubt that we pay insufficient attention in our everyday work to the spectre of a coming war. We do not arouse among the workers the legitimate amount of alarm which would thus make them more watchful with respect to questions of imperialist conflicts. The Comintern will probably have to concern itself with this side of the work of our brother Parties in the near future. There is also no doubt whatever, that a new European revolutionary outburst could only be regarded as most probable during a war situation. Ever since the Paris Commune, big revolutionary movements have always been connected with wars. This has been the case in 1871, 1905 and in 1917. Under existing historic conditions, the success of the revolutionary movement is much more dependent on the international situation than was the case with the revolutions of 1830 or 1848.

But at the same time we are of the opinion that it would

be extremely dangerous to declare in advance revolution is impossible in a separate country unless there be a world war just because of this international dependence. Did Lenin consider such partial revolutions possible in the imperialist epoch? Most decidedly so. We have already quoted above his view on colonial wars which he connected with "the victory of the proletariat in one of the most important countries." It is true that he made such an action of the working class on a separate section of the imperialist front dependent upon the existence of a favourable international situation (utilisation of differences between the various imperialist robbers or of coalitions between them, difficulties of the ruling classes, economic convulsions, acuteness of national struggle in countries of many nationalities, etc.). Lenin was well aware that such partial revolutionary outbursts can be the forerunners of events on a much larger international scale.

"Ultra Imperialism" and Revolutionary Abstinence.

The point of view excluding all possibilities of revolutionary movements during the phase now opening up before us, has a great deal in common with the appreciation of the international situation given by the representatives of the Comintern right-wing. They have only been able to consider the European Labour movement in the light of complete enslavement to American capital. The inevitability of American dictatorship confronts the whole world. The Dawes Plan is but one of the initial episodes of the extension of American domination over Europe. If we combine these prospects of American dictatorship with the detail of a partial revolutionary upheaval during the present period of development of the European Labour movement because of its complete submission to American capital, this argument would mean that the movement would be retarded by ten years. We are now entering a new phase of ultra-imperialism, whose advent was foreseen by such German imperialists as Henri Cuno.

Wherein lies the error of such reasoning?

In their arguments, the supporters of these views draw their conclusions from the conditions of abstract development of capitalist relations, completely failing to take into account both the contradictions of capitalist society, and the active intervention of the working class. The whole world puts up with this fully-fledged American dictatorship which goes

unrestricted and unhindered. But can one really approach the question so one-sidedly? Can one, for instance, in reviewing the tendencies of development of English imperialism leave out of account such a force as five million organised trade union workers? For the supporters of these views all further development is drawn in a kind of ideal straight line whose direction remains uninfluenced by any other factors. They completely lose sight of the argument of the class struggle. Labour parties, trade unions, the degree of resistance of the proletariat to imperialist robbery, all these seem to be swallowed up in a kind of catastrophical pit. They take one pole of the development of capitalist relations and artificially isolate it from the whole ensemble of other intervening factors (class war, national struggle, the colonial movement, contradictions among the imperialist robbers, and the resistance of Europe to colonisation), and on this abstract lifeless scheme they construct a hopeless declining perspective. They over-estimate the impetuousness of capitalist tendencies and under-estimate the capabilities of working class resistance. That is why this theory has to lean its right shoulder on "Kautskyism." One has only to conjure up this ideal dictatorship of an American trust over the whole of Europe, enslaving all countries, and drawing into the whirlpool of its policy whole peoples, and one sees exactly how closely this theory of ultra-imperialism resembles the Wilsonism of Kautsky, developed as far back as 1915 in a series of articles in the *Neue Zeit*. Kautsky foretold in his articles the "phase of extending the policy of cartels to foreign policy." This view of Kautsky's was linked up with the idea of a possible uniting of finance-capital into one powerful international organisation, exploiting the world without wars and without upheavals. In reality, this was a softly worded hypocritical prophesy of imperialist pacifism, actually preparing the ground for the organisation of the famous League of Nations, whose place will be taken during the present historically concrete conditions by the dictatorship of American capital.

The reason we are dealing with questions of the stabilisation of capitalism and questions of perspectives, in great detail is simply because an attempt was made at the Enlarged Executive of the Comintern to interpret in too wide a sense the fact of the absence of a revolutionary situation in Central Europe. Some of the Yugo-Slavian comrades demanded that we even extended this estimation to the Balkans, openly admitting that for the whole of Europe the phase of revolutionary upheavals had passed away. On the other hand, the Czecho-Slovakian comrades tried to base their ex-

planation of the Party crisis that the Czechoslovak Party is now going through, on this pessimistic interpretation. In their opinion this transition of the whole of Europe to a situation such as existed in 1907 demanded a revision of Comintern tactics on the part of all Communist Parties. The crisis in the Czechoslovakian Party arose out of the fact that during the objectively non-revolutionary situation the Party used the same tactical measures that it had inherited from the period of "revolutionary onrush" of 1918 and 1919. From this it follows that the Comintern should have sought the origin of the crisis in the inexpediency of the mass actions which took place not long ago in Czechoslovakia in connection with the working class struggle against the high cost of living.

Tactics of the Communist Parties.

Our estimate of the present situation should by no means be interpreted in the sense that we should close our eyes to the various changes that have taken place in the international situation and in the correlation of working class forces during recent years. During 1918 and 1919, and in 1923, in Germany we carried out a frontal attack on capitalism, stormed capitalism in open fights, but it would be absurd to deny the fact that so far this attack has been beaten off by capital. At the present time we are compelled to retreat in order and without panic. In Germany and perhaps in several other countries to-morrow we will have to reform our ranks in accordance with new correlations of forces, so as to be able to emerge from this transition phase with the least possible damage. It is this flexibility of tactics that has always been the very spirit of revolutionary Marxism and Leninism. The line of revolution will never be represented as a straight line. In all countries the Labour movement during the different periods has developed a zig-zag course, going through periods of rise and fall. It would be a great misfortune for any party which does not take into consideration the changes in the correlations of forces now going on, and the changes in the moods of the proletarian masses, but which formulates its tactics merely according to a cut and dried pattern. Such a Party would merely be a makeshift and not a Party of the wide working class masses remaining with them throughout all their struggles. Such a Party would threaten to become dogmatic and would give birth either to a revolutionary or opportunist sect. People such as Bordiga want to formulate the tactics of a Communist Party according to only one

aspect of future revolutionary struggle. For this reason during the present phase of retarded development of the revolutionary movement such people appear to be standing aside from the leadership of their Party, and from the working masses. In their opinion the tactical policy of the Party is always rigid. They come into contact with the working class "just for an hour" at the time of the rise in the revolutionary wave. During all other times, it is simply a policy of "purity of principle" a prophecy not yet understood by the masses awaiting the justification of its policy in the face of history. The outcome of all this is the peculiar form of pure abstentionism of Bordigism, which, as a matter of fact is a reflection of those very same frames of mind which were so characteristic of the Left sectarian groups of the Second International. For such groups as these a revolution is a kind of far away "social myth" and not a bloody reality of the present day. Even in times of the every-day class struggle they preferred the position of the "extreme opposition," where they were not bound down to anything, which with its practical fruitlessness brought them very near to the views of the right elements of the Labour movement. It is not by chance that Comrade Bordiga who quite recently stood on the extreme left-wing of the Comintern, during the latter month has more and more slid into practically supporting the policy of Brandler in Germany, Rosmer and Monatte in France, and the Russian opposition in Russia.

But whereas the extreme left digression errs in so far as its supporters strive to formulate their policy, exclusively on the rise of the revolutionary wave, the right opportunist elements are always wanting to construct the tactics of the Communist International according to the dictates of the revolutionary decline. Therefore, their tactics are an everlasting reflection of "defeatism" of the working class. Mathematically speaking, both of these deviations might be represented as two parallel lines between which runs the real active revolutionary struggle of the working class.

The Main Danger is from the Right.

There is no doubt at all that during the next few years we shall have new attempts at reviving both these digressions in the Communist movement. But we should immediately make ourselves quite clear as to which of these two dangers is the most serious and most harmful for us. Six years ago when the Communist International was born amid the shoc

and shell of revolutionary struggles in Russia and Germany, our young Communist groups were inclined to tear ahead and get cut off from the deeply-rooted proletarian lines of communication, thereby supplementing the sober strategy of the revolutionary struggle by revolutionary phrases. At that time Lenin had to combat the "infantile disease of leftism" with all decidedness, as this danger threatened us with the ruin of the whole cause of the Communist International. At the present moment, when the tempo of development of revolutionary events has slowed down, the main danger comes from the right. This is proved in the first place by the whole history of our young movement and also by the experience of the 1905 revolution. Anyone who has followed the history of our Party knows that the liquidatory epidemic reached its climax during the years 1907-10, at the time of the receding revolutionary wave. At the Enlarged Executive, we came up against the first signs of such liquidatory tendencies in our discussion with the Brunn leading group of the Czechoslovakian Communist Party. This group showed by the memorandum it presented to the Enlarged Executive of the Comintern that it differs from the policy of the Communist International on thorough fundamental questions. The political perspective of this group amounted to denying the revolution in general. This group narrows down the role of the Party during revolutionary events in a purely Menshevist conception. They contested the possibility of any mass activities whatever until such time as they enjoyed the sympathy of the army, thereby ignoring the whole experience of the proletarian struggle, and of the European revolutions and particularly the experience of the Russian Revolution.

Of late another characteristic symptom of this danger has been the epidemic of running across from the left-wing to the right, which we have witnessed so frequently recently. Such people as Rosmer, Monatte, Kreibich, that is, comrades who in their time have done great services for the revolutionary movement, and who for a number of years have helped the Comintern to fight against opportunist digressions have now been swept aside to the right like so many specks of dust.

And this "evolution" is by far from being of a personal character, but has a symptomatic significance. The Czechoslovakian question has been a proper barometer of such anes of mind as these. Thanks to this Czechoslovakian conflict, such clearly traced lines have been drawn between

the different tendencies within the Comintern, whilst the true nature of the various groupings has been so clearly disclosed that the political significance and import of the debates that took place during the Russian discussion and at the Fifth Congress of the Comintern must appear clear even to the blind. To Bolshevise the European parties means training their cadres of rank and file workers in the most energetic merciless struggle against the penetration of Social-Democratic ideas into our movement.

The Social-Democrats and the Masses.

We have become accustomed to consider the strengthening of the Social-Democrats as one of the signs of political stabilisation. In the first place we have in view Germany. The German social-democracy which was completely compromised by its conduct during the war, and sullied by its treachery of working class interests during the German revolution, has none the less continued to be a Party embracing considerable numbers of workers. However unpleasant for us, this is still a fact with which we have to reckon. An indifferent attitude towards this fact would be exceedingly harmful at the present moment. We must frankly recognise that the Russian Mensheviks never had such an influence among the working class as the German Social-Democrats have now. The forces of internal cohesion still hold the older generations of workers exceedingly firmly in the ranks of this party. We have undoubtedly overestimated the importance of the recent scandals, have presumed that after the Barmat affair and the Ebert process at Magdeburg it would be comparatively easy for us to carry the elements of decomposition into the camp of German social-democracy. If the murder of Rosa Luxemburg and Karl Liebknecht was not a sufficiently convincing argument as to the decline and decay of the German Social-Democrats for many German workers, then it is evident that the recent events have also not led to a turning point in the mood of these workers who still follow social-democracy by their very inertia. It is just this circumstance that compelled our Communist Party in Germany to ponder very seriously on its tactics. To fight with capitalism in Germany at the present moment means mercilessly denouncing the German social-democracy, which is one of the component parts of the capitalist structure. But at the same time, we must wrest from this party the weapons which it uses for doping the masses and holding them in the grip of its influence. What have the recent presidential elections taught us? A section of the German proletariat, placed

under the threat of monarchist or fascist restoration, instinctively supported the German social-democracy as a party which in their opinion guarded the interests of the Republic. We now come to the question—is this party now really a republican party—has it not proved by the history of all its treachery that it is ever ready to capitulate before the attack of a monarchist restoration? In actuality it would seem that this role has not yet become clear to a considerable section of the German workers, and also to those strata of the petty bourgeoisie who voted for the Social-Democrats at the last presidential elections. The main difference between 1925 and 1923 in Germany is that our Party must now fight against the monarchist danger under new conditions. Lenin some time after the setback to the Russian Revolution in the years 1905 and 1906, at a time when the Russian Party was torn with dissension on the question as to whether to take part in or abstain from the election to the National Duma, said :

“If history has compelled us to go into a pigsty (and Stolypin’s Duma was just such a pigsty), why we will work there also for the glory of the Revolution and for its further development.”

Our brother Communist Party of Germany is at present faced with a similar change of tactics. It has to link up its struggle against the monarchist danger with the slogan of proletarian dictatorship, and we have no doubt that the German comrades will successfully bring about this change of tactics. They already partly did so in January last, when the question of the struggle for the partial demands of the proletariat was placed on the agenda of the Party conference. At the present time the most essential factor of Leninist strategy and tactics is to make these partial demands the starting point in our struggle for the proletarian dictatorship, and to use them for training the revolutionary consciousness of the masses just as on a general European scale we train the masses with every partial revolutionary upheaval. Our German comrades need not be afraid of being accused of changing their position, for the objective situation itself has changed. The error of Bandler and his tendency was that in an objectively revolutionary situation he steered a course in keeping with a decline of the revolutionary wave. There will, of course, be no small number of people who having lost the revolution at an earlier date will now say that the present change in tactics on the part of the German Communist Party corresponds with the tactical policy which they always considered correct. But the Com-

intern and the Communist Party of Germany will be able appropriately to resist these people, and show them that during the concrete historical situation of 1923, their policy inevitably led to the defeat of the revolution, whereas the policy of the German Party during the most difficult conditions of 1925 is preparing the ground for the future success of the revolution.

No matter from what angle the German Right may bombard our brother Communist Party of Germany, the Comintern will always be able to prove that the failures and defeats of the Party are the result of the unsuccessful revolution for whose defeat the right-wing bears full responsibility. To transfer this responsibility to the present leadership of the Party would be just as erroneous as blaming the commander of any army who takes over the reins of command at the time of its defeat.

The main task of the Communist Party should now be the struggle to win over the masses. The Party should be everywhere where the workers are united together, in order to tear them away from the influence of the Social-Democrats. Above all, the Party must concentrate its attention on studying the trade unions. It will be very opportune in this connection to refer to the experience of the Russian Bolsheviks during the years of reaction following 1907. The idea of unity of the trade union movement is penetrating deeper and deeper among the ranks of Social-Democratic workers and gaining new supporters every-day. For the Social-Democratic leaders this campaign is of mortal danger, as it will open the eyes of the masses wider and wider, as to the true role of the Social-Democrats.

Spasmodically the Amsterdam International is trying to paralyse the results of our campaign in favour of trade union unity. They realise that in the Labour movement a kind of internal "revolution" is proceeding on an international scale which not only threatens to change the correlation of forces within the Labour movement, but also the correlations of the opposing classes. During the present phase opening up before us, they will do their utmost to bring about a split in the trade union movement, for it is only such a split that will guarantee to the bourgeoisie their domination on an international scale.

It is indeed for this reason that our Communist Parties should make the struggle for unity of the trade union move-

ment the central point of their agitation and policy. At the present time, fighting for Bolshevism means fighting to win over the masses and to unite them under the banner of the class struggle. All our Communist Parties must assimilate this. The rapprochement between the English and Russian trade unions has an immeasurable historical significance. The German Social-Democrat, Jackobi once said that the organisation of the first trade union in Germany had a more political significance than the battle of Sadowa. We have even more grounds for applying these words to the present situation. What is now happening in the English Labour movement will have no less significance for the destinies of the world revolutionary movement than the Dawes Plan and the trend of capitalist development towards the establishment of American dictatorship. Let the bourgeoisie feast while the plague rages, joyous over the temporary retreat of the proletariat. We are firmly convinced that the whole of history is working in our favour. Untiredly history is digging the grave of this social order for whose longevity the bourgeois economists are singing their "Hosannah" together with other people who have lost all political consciousness even among our Communist ranks.

Conclusions.

After the Enlarged Executive of the Comintern, the following tasks face our Communist sections: (1) the question of the economic stabilisation of capitalism has not yet been fully worked out; our sections must systematically and persistently study the economy of their countries and the processes going on therein so that by the next Congress we will have enough complete material for correctly judging the perspectives of further development. To study the economic literature of our opponents, to keep pace with the pulse of our economic life, and to take careful note of all the factors that complicate or retard the process of capitalist recuperation—these are now the immediate tasks for the foremost theorists and economists of our brother Communist Parties. We must put an end to the period of pure "politics," we must get down to study the most serious problems from a Leninist standpoint, i.e., we must study revolutionary strategy on the basis of an analysis of the correlation of forces and tendencies of economic development; (2) we must carry out the fundamental tactical and strategical policies formulated by the Fifth World Congress with a firm Bolshevik hand, taking into account the concrete conditions of each separate country and the general position of its Labour

movement; (3) the partial demands of the working class must be put forward at all possible moments and connected up with the final aims of our movement and with the struggle for the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat; (4) to carry on the struggle for unity of the trade union movement on an international scale not losing the smallest opportunity for its practical realisation in one country or another. We must carry on this campaign a hundred times more forcibly and energetically than has been done hitherto; (5) train the working masses, that is, Bolshevise them on the basis of denouncing right-wing digressions which at the present time represent the most serious danger for the Comintern.

D. MANUILSKY.



Conference of the Sections of the Comintern on Organisation

INVITATIONS to this conference were sent to representatives of the Central Committee and the Berlin and Hamburg organisations of the Communist Party of Germany, to the Central Committee and the Paris and Northern district organisations of the Communist Party of France, the Central Committee and the Turin organisation of the Communist Party of Italy, the Central Committee and the Prague organisations of the Communist Party of Czecho-Slovakia, and the Central Committees of the Communist Parties of Great Britain, Poland, Sweden and Norway. Actually representatives of all the Parties represented at the Enlarged Plenum took part in the conference. Furthermore, representatives of the largest local organisations in Germany and particularly of Czecho-Slovakia, took part which made it possible for the conference to become acquainted with the state of Party organisation, not only from the reports of the representatives of the various Central Committees, but also from the reports of local representatives.

Considerable interest was displayed in the conference by the delegates to the Plenum. Lively discussions took place on the reports. In this article, we will deal only with those questions dealt with, which in our opinion, present the greatest interest to the various sections of the Communist International.

Prominence was given to the question of organisation at the Fifth Congress of the Comintern. In the Organisation Commission of the Congress, the question was discussed as to whether it was possible to re-organise the Communist Parties outside of Russia on the factory nucleus basis. With the exception of a few towns in Germany and in France, and one town in Italy (Turin), nuclei had not yet been formed at that time, and the nuclei which existed in Germany and in Italy were not regular Party organisations with definite Party functions; they dragged out a miserable existence.

Quite a different situation existed at the time of the Organisation Conference. No one disputed the question as

to whether the Communist Parties of the West should establish nuclei and whether the experience of Russia was applicable to the Western Parties. During the eight months that have transpired since the Fifth Congress, the Communist Parties and the Young Communist Leagues have achieved considerable success in organising factory nuclei. According to incomplete returns, in March, 22 Communist Parties had 8,822 factory nuclei and 18 Young Communist Leagues had 2,255 nuclei. The discussions that arose at the conference were over the questions as to how best organise these nuclei, how to attract the members of the nuclei to Party work and what place they should occupy in the Party organisation. As the debates at the conference centred mainly around these questions, we will deal with them here in detail.

Forms of Party Organisation Prior to the Fifth Congress.

Passivity of Party Members.

In legal parties organised on a residential district basis, the members of the Party met together once a month and sometimes even once in three months at town meetings, and in large towns at district meetings, at which reports from the various Party organs were read and various Party questions discussed.

Connection between the Party committee and the members of the Party was maintained by these meetings and also by the Party dues collector, who visited the homes of the members and collected the Party dues.

In illegal and semi-legal Parties organised on a residential basis, the membership was divided into groups of ten, at the head of which was an elected or appointed captain ("functionary"). The various leading Party bodies were connected directly with the functionaries. The groups of ten organised on a residential basis carry out Party work only during campaigns, during elections, demonstrations, etc. In ordinary times, the functionary did the work, and even then, not in all cases. This form of organisation created a mass of passive members, for the work was done without them and it was no one's business to draw them into the work. In the Berlin-Brandenburg district, where Party nuclei already exist, out of 20,000 members only from 10,000 to 12,000 members do any kind of Party work (official report of Organisation Bureau of Berlin-Brandenburg Committee), and in Czecho-Slovakia only 25 to 30 per cent. of the members are drawn into Party work.

The Party members belonging to a given group are usually employed in different factories. Consequently, the Communists working in the same factory, prior to the organisation of factory nuclei, did not know each other. Under the old system, the Party members worked among the non-Party workers in a given factory at their own risk, without any guidance, without system or plan. Cases have occurred when Communists unconsciously have acted against their fellow Party members owing to the fact that they did not know each other. Moreover, the district and town Party Committees did not know in what factories there were Communists, and in what numbers, because members were registered according to the place of residence. Since factory nuclei have been organised by both legal and illegal parties, Party work has revised—as was admitted by many of those present at the Conference, even by those who, at the Fifth Congress, were opposed to re-organisation on the factory nucleus basis. The members of the Party in the nuclei have been drawn into Party work, new members have been made from among workers at the bench, new readers have been obtained from among the factory workers for the Party press; the Communists are conducting work according to a definite plan drawn up by the nucleus. The recent large Labour demonstrations which took place in Paris, Berlin, Prague and Kladno have shown that through the nuclei the Communist Parties have established connection with the working men and women in the factories.

But the factory nuclei do not work well everywhere where they exist. From the reports of the representatives of the Central Committees and local organisations of various Parties, it is evident that the proportion of factory nuclei which work badly is very large. In the Communist Party of France, out of 2,500 nuclei, 1,000 worked indifferently, 750 worked badly, and 750 worked very well. In the Berlin-Brandenburg districts, out of 1,800 nuclei, 540 worked tolerably well, while the remaining 1,260 have not been drawn into the work (report by the Organising Bureau of the Berlin-Brandenburg Committee), in Chemnitz only 50 per cent of the existing nuclei are functioning. The situation is not better in Czecho-Slovakia. There, out of 942 factory nuclei, barely 45 to 50 per cent. are functioning. The same may be said with regard to the Young Communist League.

The large proportion of inactive and badly functioning nuclei creates a dangerous situation for the further development of these factory organisations. Furthermore, it will

be very difficult to convince comrades who belong to inactive or badly functioning nuclei of the necessity for the further existence of these organisations.

What is the reason for the existence of so large a number of inactive nuclei?

In the first place, very frequently the competent leading Party bodies have failed to devote sufficient attention to the nuclei after they have been formed. No instructions were given them, the manner in which they worked was not investigated, Party questions were not brought up at the nuclei meetings for discussion and the Party slogans were not explained. In short, the nuclei were not imbued with political life.

Secondly, in certain countries where unemployment is very prevalent, and Communists are victimised by the employers, the Social-Democratic and trade union bureaucrats usually help the employers to discover the Communists in the factories, and secure their dismissal. For that reason, the Communists in the factories fear to develop their work.

Thirdly, in large towns, like Berlin, Paris, London, New York, etc., the workers live at a great distance from their places of employment. The arrival and departure of workmen's trains are adapted to working time. When Communists stay to attend a meeting or to carry out some Party duty, they have to miss their train, which entails a long wait for the next train.

And fourthly, in Czecho-Slovakia and Germany the previous forms of organisation according to residence—the groups of ten—have been allowed to continue to exist side by side with the factory nuclei. Age-long Social-Democratic habits, victimisation by employers, inconvenient train services, the lack of vitality of the factory nuclei and the continued existence of the old residential district organisation at which the members continue to meet and discuss Party questions, all this prevents the development and the intensification of the activity of the factory nuclei which have been formed after so much effort. For these reasons, the Conference on Organisation in its resolution, which was endorsed by the Enlarged Plenum, calls upon the Communist Parties to devote serious attention to giving definite instructions to the already existing factory nuclei, to transfer the centre of Party work to these factory nuclei, and

urged the necessity for establishing closer connection than exists at the present time between the factory nuclei and the respective Party bodies. The resolution urges that in those districts where the majority of the members are already organised in factory nuclei, the groups of ten and residential district organisations must be dissolved. Unless these latter are dissolved, it will be difficult to induce the members of the Party to attend the meetings of and work in the nuclei.*

Functionaries and "Responsible Persons" (Active Workers.)

The passivity of Party members to which reference has been made, gave rise to the institution of so-called functionaries and responsible persons, who, as a matter of fact, decided all political and Party questions in spite of the fact that they had no authority from the members of the Party to do so. This in its turn fostered the inactivity of the members of the Party, because as a consequence of this, they were not drawn into the discussion and decision of economic, political and Party questions. Meetings of functionaries and responsible persons began to take the place of district and town conferences, and cases have occurred when such meetings have passed resolutions directly contrary to the decisions of the corresponding Party Conference. The system of functionaries is widespread in those countries where strong Social-Democratic organisations existed (Germany, Czecho-Slovakia, Austria, etc.), from which the Communist Parties inherited the system. Every year, the Party committees give to Party, trade union, co-operative society, etc., workers a mandate to take part in meetings of functionaries in the given district or town. The Competent Party committee convenes these meetings. During the course of this year, the functionary continues to regard himself as such and continues to attend the meeting of functionaries even if he has ceased to perform the work which gave him the right to attend these meetings. The minutes of the Organising Bureau of the Berlin-Brandenburg Committee show that of 48 functionary mandates examined, only one was owned by

* The instruction on organising factory nuclei endorsed by the Fifth Congress, permits of the organisation of Party members not employed in factories, in street nuclei. Members of the Party who belong to factory nuclei, but who work at a great distance from their place of residence, must, in addition to their membership of a factory nucleus, register with the Party Committee in the district where they live. After working hours and on holidays, the Party member may be given definite duties by the residential district committee.

a comrade who was a member of a nucleus, of 50 functionary mandates in Berlin District No. 15, only two belonged to comrades working in nuclei. Consequently, the nucleus workers (secretaries and chairmen) of Berlin represent only an inconsiderable proportion at the meetings of Berlin functionaries and have little influence on its decisions. In his report on the Kladno (Czecho-Slovakia) Party organisation, Comrade Kreibich stated that the meeting of functionaries decide all important questions, while the Party Conferences, which are rarely convened, discuss only trifling matters.

At the conference and in the commission set up to examine the form of organisation of the leading Party bodies, consisting of representatives of the nine largest Parties and of the Young Communist International, the question of the system of the functionaries gave rise to a very heated discussion. With the exception of the representatives of the Communist Party of Germany who proposed that the meeting of functionaries be given the right to decide questions, everybody came to the conclusion that the existence of the system of functionaries in its present form was harmful.

In its resolution, which was endorsed by the Enlarged Plenum, the Conference on Organisation did not object, but even recommended to the local Party bodies to convene conferences of secretaries or of nucleus committees, of secretaries or fraction committees in mass labour and peasant organisations, or of comrades managing any particular branch of Party work, to discuss Party, trade union, co-operative, questions or campaigns; but it opposed the present system of functionaries and strongly objected to substituting district or town conferences by meetings of functionaries. The resolution recommends that periodical district or town Party conferences be called and that the agenda of such conferences be preliminary discussed in the nuclei, after which the latter are to elect delegates to the Party Conference.

Factory Nucleus Newspapers.

Factory nucleus newspapers rapidly became popular in Western Europe. In Germany more than 1,000 are published and in France, nearly 500. Such newspapers are also published in Czecho-Slovakia, Austria, England and in other countries. The factory newspapers in the West differ from the factory newspapers published in Russia, in that the latter are wall newspapers, while in the West, it is not

possible to display these newspapers on the factory walls. Consequently, they are published illegally, in various ways (on mimiographs, typewriters and sometimes printed) in hundreds and sometimes in thousands of copies and distributed among the workers in the factory. In most cases these newspapers are got up exclusively by the efforts of the members of the nucleus. Some of the newspapers contain very interesting drawings and cartoons. The nucleus newspaper has become an inseparable part of nucleus work and it has become the principal medium through which the nucleus exercises its influence upon the workers in the factory in which the nucleus cannot act openly. In Italy, the Party Committees, instead of factory newspapers, publish small leaflets dealing with important questions which have considerable influence upon the workers. Many of the factory newspapers still suffer from numerous defeats. Some are devoted exclusively to politics and repeat what has been said already in the Party daily, while others are devoted exclusively to affairs connected with the factory, without linking them up with the slogans of the Party. The Conference on Organisation passed a resolution on factory nuclei newspapers recommending the Parties to continue publishing such newspapers and making it obligatory for the secretaries of district Party committees, or the agitation and propaganda departments of these committees, to devote serious attention to these newspapers and keep them well instructed. The resolution points out the good and bad sides of the newspapers already published.

The Weakness of Local Party Apparatus.

It was established at the Conference on Organisation that in a number of towns in Czecho-Slovakia, France and England, there is not even one Party worker engaged full-time on Party work. The Party apparatus is concentrated principally in the provincial committees. In 39 districts in the Paris area, the district committees commence Party work after working hours, because even the secretary of the district committee is employed in some factory or office. In some towns in England, the town committees have no full time workers, and, of course, full time district workers is out of the question. In large towns in America, like Chicago and Boston, there are not even district committees, but only town committees.

It is quite impossible under such conditions to build up a strong, disciplined, centralised, flexible organisation.

How can a provincial committee or a town committee in a large town react quickly to events, intervene in labour conflicts, if the district committees have no permanently operating apparatus, and if there is not even a full time district secretary? How can the provincial or town committee quickly give instructions if there are no permanent organs in the districts to convey these instructions to the proper quarters? Such a state of affairs might have been tolerated under the former system of organisation when the members of the Party were convened once a month or once every three months, and when the functionaries and responsible members decide all the questions **for** the Party **instead** of the members deciding them. But this cannot be tolerated when the Party is re-organised on a factory nucleus basis, for we shall be able to establish ourselves firmly in the factories only when our nuclei will be active and intervene in all the conflicts between the workers and employers; when they will be able to direct the discontent of the workers along the correct lines of the class struggle; and this will be possible when the district or ward committee will be able to give proper and correct instructions to the nucleus and will be in a position to see that these instructions are carried out. For this it is necessary for at least one comrade, say the secretary, to be a full-time Party worker. The Conference on Organisation called the attention of the Communist Parties to the necessity for intensifying the work of the district and ward committees and to appoint a full time Party worker for these committees.

The Weakness of the Communist Fractions in Non-Party Mass Worker and Peasant Organisations.

It became evident at the Conference that the Communist fractions, where they existed, work very badly, that their relations with the Party organisations are not regular and that the Party organisations have not devoted sufficient attention either to the organisation of Communist fractions or to their work.

The position with regard to parliamentary fractions is more or less satisfactory. These are under the constant control and guidance of the Central Committees of the Parties, but even in these, symptoms of social-democracy are to be observed in the tendency of the parliamentary fractions to strive to become completely independent of the Central Committee of the Party (Czecho-Slovakia).

The position with regard to the relations between the Communist organisations and the Communist Party fractions in Landtags and similar bodies can be regarded as tolerable, although Communist fractions in bodies functioning in districts remote from the centre still work independently of the Party.

In the peasant parties in many countries (Rumania, Yugo-Slavia, France, Germany and America) no fractions have been formed and the Communists in these organisations are unorganised.

In many countries no fractions have been formed in sport organisations, and in those places where they have been formed, they work isolatedly, without guidance and without local or national organisation.

The situation with regard to fractions in the trade unions is no better.

Communists regard it beneath their dignity to join Christian, National Socialist, Liberal and other trade unions, in spite of the fact that in Germany and Czecho-Slovakia, these organisations still have a considerable working class membership. When trade unions affiliated to the Profintern were formed in France, Czecho-Slovakia and in Germany, the Communists left the Amsterdam trade unions and transferred to the red trade unions. Consequently, the Amsterdam unions were relieved of the Communists and their work and in the red trade unions, the Communists who principally lead these unions, consider it superfluous to form fractions to work under the guidance of the Party organisations. As a result of all this, a tendency is observed as in Czecho-Slovakia, for example, for the Communists in the trade unions affiliated to the Profintern to strive to throw off the influence of the Party organisation and to act independently.

In France and Czecho-Slovakia, the Communist Parties, through their members belonging to the trade unions affiliated to the Profintern, were able to establish connection with the factories. But the fact that no Party nuclei had been formed, prevented the members of the revolutionary trade unions from conducting systematic work (in France) and led to the Communist members of the revolutionary trade unions putting up candidates for the factory committees and other bodies without coming to an understanding with the Party organisations concerning these candidatures (Czecho-Slovakia).

The Social-Democratic Parties in Germany, Austria and Czecho-Slovakia have no factory nuclei, but they are so closely connected with the Amsterdam trade unions that, through them, they are able to exert their influence upon the workers in the factories.

The Communist Parties should do the same thing through the medium of the Communist members of the trade unions; they should exert their influence through the fractions. But these fractions must work under the guidance and control of the Party organisations.

In spite of the fact that our Party in England has considerable influence in the Minority Movement, it has not consolidated this influence organisationally, and has not formed strong fractions.

In Germany many of our Party members remained in the Amsterdam trade unions and many who left are returning to them. In many places Communists are elected to the provincial management committees of the unions and in some places even have a majority; but right up to this day, neither in town, provincial, area or national bodies have fractions been formed. The work of the fractions in Germany is not conducted systematically, and the amount of attention which their importance deserves is not paid to them.

The Conference on Organisation devoted considerable attention to the work of the fractions and drew up a list of instructions making it obligatory upon all the sections to take up this work in the most energetic fashion and to form fractions in all the non-Party mass organisations.

Organisational Forms in the Workers' Party of America.

It will not be superfluous to say a few words concerning the Workers' Party of America, for it reveals the chaos in Party construction that exists in certain sections of the Communist International.

The members of the Workers' Party of America are organised not in factory nuclei, but according to nationality. The Lithuanians, Letts, Finns, Swedes, Yugo-Slavians, etc., are organised in separate organisations, each having its own national and local apparatus. Of such organisations there are seventeen. All of these together form the Workers'

Party. These separate national organisations collect the dues from their members, have their own daily and weekly newspapers, their own printing presses, their own clubs and halls.

Actually the national centre—the Central Committee of the Workers' Party, and the town and State committees of the Party are dependent upon the will of these seventeen separate organisations. If the latter desire to carry out the decisions of the Central Committee they do so; if not, then they are not carried out.

These seventeen separate organisations send their representatives to town and State conferences in proportion to their membership. These conferences elect town and State committees respectively. The State conference elects delegates to the national conference.

The State committees and the Central Committee only appear to bear the character of Party centres in the State or in the whole country, but as has been stated, the fulfilment of their decisions depends entirely upon the goodwill of the various national organisations; the Party bodies have no independent means of getting their decisions carried through.

Can such a system of Party organisation lead to the establishment of a centralised disciplined Party? Can such a Party work successfully among the nearly 30 millions of the working class in America?

Of course, in a polyglot country like America it is very difficult to establish a centralised Party, and it is very difficult to work among the numerous and varied elements which came to America from various countries, having different customs, and living in various stages of development. But in order that the Workers' Party may become really capable of organising the working class and of leading it to the fight, it must be organised in such a manner that all the members of the Party, working in the same factory, irrespective of nationality, join the same factory nucleus. The district committees should be elected at conferences of representatives, of factory nuclei and street nuclei; the district conferences should elect delegates for the town conferences and the town conferences should elect delegates to the State conferences. The nuclei district committees, town committees and State committees should serve as Party organs for all the members of the Party irrespective of nationality.

From the reports contained in the *Daily Worker* of March 3rd, 1925, it appears that the few factory nuclei that have been formed work well, and that they have shown, not only that their existence is possible, but that it is absolutely necessary, for some of them have succeeded in organising great mass meetings of protest against the conviction of Sacco and Vanzetti, have conducted campaigns against child labour and have succeeded in getting their members elected to several local bodies of the Miners' Union.

The nuclei should arrange their work in such a manner that the work be conducted among all the nationalities in the given factory. The district committees should establish agitation and propaganda departments to organise the work among the workers of all nationalities and for this purpose to enlist the services of all the active Party workers who formerly have been working in the various national organisations. The State and Central Committees of the Workers' Party should also establish their agitation and propaganda departments for the purpose of guiding the work and getting it carried on among the workers of all nationalities and for this purpose enlisting the services of the comrades who formerly worked in the various national organisations. At the same time Lithuanian, Lettish, Finnish, Swedish, Russian, etc., members of the Party, who belong to various national non-Party organisations must form local and national fractions in these respective organisations. These fractions must work under the guidance of the district, town, State and Central Committees of the Workers' Party respectively.

Only when the Party will be organised on this basis, will it become a fit and militant mass Party.

It will not be possible to bring about this re-organisation without some difficulty, but if the necessity is understood and the desire is there, the gradual re-organisation of the Party on this basis is quite possible.

Formerly, in America several trade unions were divided into national and language sections, for example, the Miners' Union, but gradually this was abolished. The trade unions did not suffer as a result of this, but now have centralised leadership. If the trade unions managed to do this (and if this they were assisted by the Workers' Party), it should be quite possible for the Workers' Party to do so.

The Organising Department of the E.C.C.I. will devote very serious attention to the re-organisation of the Workers' Party.

Conclusion,

The Conference on Organisation for the first time clearly brought out the state of Party organisation in the largest sections of the Communist International. The good and the bad sides of Party organisation were revealed. It was possible to clear up controversial questions and the harmfulness of various existing forms of organisation, as for example, the system of functionaries, the parallel existence of groups of ten organised according to place of residence and factory nuclei, the erroneous opinion regarding the superfluousness of organising fractions in opportunist trade unions, etc., were made clear.

The forms of organisation of Communist fractions were established. A resolution was passed on the work of the nuclei, the arrangement of the work of the nuclei and the attraction of the members of the nuclei to Party work.

A resolution was also passed on factory nucleus newspapers in which their good and bad sides were pointed out and indications given as to how they should be published in future.

The members of the Conference exchanged views with regard to the question as to how Party campaigns should be carried out. The established utility of linking up factory nuclei in a given industry with the factory nuclei in the same industry in other countries. Furthermore, the Conference on Organisation passed a set of model rules for various sections providing for the new form of Party organisation and also a set of instructions on the organisation of the Party apparatus from the nucleus right up to the Central Committee. The sections of the Communist International and local bodies will be able to apply these with advantage, allowances being made for local conditions.

The instructions, resolutions and that part of Comrade Zinoviev's theses on Bolshevisation which refers to the question of organisation, will render it possible to introduce a uniform system of Party organisation in all the sections of the Communist International.

The fulfilment of the decisions of the Enlarged Plenum of the E.C.C.I. and of the Conference on Organisation will enable the Communist Parties to become real Bolshevik mass Parties.

O. PIATNITSKY.

President Hindenberg

1. The Aged Field-Marshal and the New Monarchism.

HINDENBURG'S election to the Presidency of the German Republic is not only "a symbolic act of profound significance," as stated to the monarchists in their press. The election of April 26th, 1925 is rather a political event of the most serious significance for Germany, for the whole world, and above all, for the class struggle of the proletariat. The monarchist grouping of forces embodied by the "aged Field-Marshal" is by no means mediæval and feudal. It is, on the contrary, young and up-to-date—it is the last word of German imperialism after a lost war, a suppressed revolution and a beginning stabilisation.

The monarchism represented by Hindenburg differs fundamentally from the fascism which Hitler brought into the open in 1923. The Hitler fascism was by nature petty bourgeois, whilst Hindenburg is the representative of big capital. In his agitation, Hitler at least advocated the people's war of revenge against France, whilst Hindenburg's victory had the silent support of powerful groups of Entente capitalists. Hitler wanted to overthrow the Republic with armed hundreds, whilst Hindenburg is going to liquidate it with the help of the Weimer Constitution to which he has sworn allegiance, and with the support of the Reichswehr and the State apparatus. Hitler was the petty bourgeois drummer of restoration, whilst Hindenburg is the Field-Marshal of the monarchy. In 1923 it rested on the hundreds, in 1925 it has an army, it wins State power and obtains 14.6 million votes, 48 per cent. of all electors, on the strength of the most democratic franchise of the world.

This is the new in Hindenburg's election.

2. Who Flocked to Hindenburg?

The astonishing part in the German presidential election is—that the Republican bloc beat the monarchist Reich-bloc at the first ballot in March 29th, with 13.2 million

votes against 11.7 million, whilst one month later, Hindenburg beat the 13.7 million Republicans who voted for Marx with 14.5 million votes.

What change has taken place within these four weeks? The Reich-bloc fought in March only with the black-white-and-red banner, with Jarres who is a determinate reactionary and a good Monarchist, but not an avowed champion of the Kaiser crown. In April, the Reich-bloc decided, after eight days of internal strife, to unfold quite openly the Kaiser banner. By bringing forward Hindenburg's candidature, it placed the Hohenzollern crown on the black-white-and-red colours before the eyes of the 30 million of German electors. And under this sign it was victorious.

The internal struggles which preceded Hindenburg's candidature are of enormous importance. Its acceptance completed a whole process of development within the German bourgeoisie and a phase of German history. The bourgeois right parties fought with themselves, or rather with their rank and file followers before they decided in favour of Hindenburg. In March it was Stresemann who prevented the setting up of a joint bourgeois candidature of the Reichswehr Minister Gessler, because he was afraid that the bourgeois bloc would bring civil war. Hindenburg's candidature was decided upon in the "Kufürstenausschuss" ("Electors' Committee") of the monarchist election register Löbel by 9 votes against 3 votes of the people's party. In the article with which Stresemann's *Zeit* welcomed Hindenburg's candidature the word "apprehension" appears no less than five times.

What are these apprehensions? There are three main reasons for them. Hindenburg's election is a bold venture which is outside politics, for he cannot continue the fulfilment policy hitherto pursued. Unlike the former Republican Foreign Ministers, he is unable to carry out the Versailles Peace Treaty unconditionally and at any cost, or to fulfil the Dawes Plan together with ALL the groups of Entente capitalists.

For the German bourgeoisie Hindenburg's election is a bold venture in internal policy, for it is bound to lead to open struggle with the working class. Employers and their bourgeois parties are not certain if they are already strong enough to proclaim this fight openly through the election of

Hindenburg. Moreover, this election means complication within the bourgeois class itself. It adds fuel to the conflicts between the various bourgeois parties and it makes thereby the formation of the bourgeois bloc more difficult. The centre and the democrats, two decidedly bourgeois parties are for a number of reasons against monarchy: the interests of the middle bourgeoisie, large sections of the petty bourgeoisie, of the manufacturing industry, the Catholic Church and above all of the Christian workers who demand a coalition with the Social-Democrats, preservation of the Republic and prevention of a restoration.

But two reasons in favour of Hindenburg, outweighed these apprehensions in the Employers' Supreme Council:

Hindenburg and the monarchy offer the best opportunity for transition to an active foreign policy, for the utilisation of the growing differences between Great Britain and France and for the re-conquest of a place in the imperialist world for Germany.

It is true that Hindenburg and monarchy increase the peril of class struggles on a larger scale in the near future but they are at the same time a stronger power-basis against a second proletarian revolution than the bourgeois republic, which found it difficult to cope with the first.

These reasons prevailed, and this is how the German big bourgeoisie went over to Hindenburg.

But it was the German petty bourgeoisie which flocked to him in its millions, for the secret of his victory lies in the social re-assurance of the petty bourgeoisie at the end of the inflation misery. The terrible years of the deterioration of the mark were over. The difficult years of reparation payments and Dawes taxes will not begin until the first of January, 1926. The petty bourgeoisie lives on a meagre income in rente-marks, and on the great expectations with respect to the restoration of the value of investments. They live badly, and yet better than two years ago. They are re-assured. They went to the fascist demonstrations of 1923 in coarse canvass coats, and armed with rubber sticks. They go to the Hindenburg demonstrations of 1925 in Sunday clothes and with their families. This is the difference

(an exception must be made, of course, for the few million members of the petty bourgeoisie who voted for Marx).

Apart from the fact that the big and petty bourgeoisie flocked to Hindenburg, three special groups of electors decided the vote in his favour during the last four weeks.

In East Prussia, large sections of the population, including no doubt also agricultural labourers, voted for the "victor of Tannenburg." Countless women voted for the Field-Marshal whose picture hangs in their room and whose name stirs their national feelings which have not been appeased since 1918.

Then there were the "non-political electors" who in March abstained from voting. The poll rose from 69 to 77.3 per cent. Hindenburg obtained his 900,000 majority through these sections of the population. This means that he was actually elected through the non-electors.

The representative of the German monarchy won his victory through the typically Bonapartist electors: agrarian districts, backward women and non-political, narrow, petty bourgeois elements.

3. The Vent-Hole of the Anglo-French Differences.

The fate of Hindenburg's regime will be in the first instance decided by the results of his foreign policy, and in the last instance by the class struggle in Germany. The Chancellor of the Reich, Luther, did, of course, declare three days after the election that "there must be naturally continuity of foreign policy." But it would be very naive to assume that Hindenburg's accession to power will not also bring a decisive change in the foreign policy of the country. It goes without saying that Hindenburg is not going to declare in a few months' time the Versailles Peace Treaty null and void, that he will mobilise the ten divisions of the German Reichswehr and the patriotic leagues and will declare war on the governments of Great Britain, France and America. But Hindenburg's secretary who does the thinking for him, Admiral Tirpitz and his party, the German Nationalists, have a very realistic and clear plan of monarchist foreign policy. Their tactics are based on the idea that there is a difference between the Versailles Peace

Treaty and the Dawes Plan. They are for the Dawes Plan, but against Versailles. To put it in a concrete form, they are for collaboration with Great Britain, but against French imperialism. They do not dream about the sudden resurrection of the old independent German imperialism with its own army, navy and colonies, but they aim with great determination and stubbornness at the development of a dependent sham and shadow imperialism as an appendix of the strongest imperialist power of Europe: Great Britain. They carry on a policy of so-called "appendix imperialism," to quote Comrade Maslov's very appropriate designation. This policy is dangerous, for it can lead overnight to conflicts with France. But it has certain prospects, for it coincides with present British interests.

One should be perfectly clear on the prospects of this appendix-imperialism: they are not very far-reaching. Germany is not Belgium or Holland, German capitalism does not rest on financial operations or trade transactions. Germany will be the only British vassal which is not a small, but a big State based on a concentrated heavy industry. German capitalism which has reached the highest stage of imperialist development is a classical example for the Lenin theory of the disproportion of capitalist development which makes it impossible to effect a prolonged stable partition of the various States. The new German appendix-imperialism is becoming a fact but at the same time it contradicts itself. It must do its utmost to become a real imperialism: with an army, a navy and colonies. It must in the not far distant future endeavour to get out of the position of an object of imperialist partitioning and to become a subject of the imperialist re-partitioning. This is where it will suffer shipwreck.

Internally the Hindenburg foreign policy betrays the national ideology of the petty bourgeoisie and the real national interests of Germany. One of the first results of Hindenburg's election is the final liquidation of nationalist opposition against the Dawes Plan. They are willing to carry out not only the Dawes Plan but also the Versailles Peace Treaty in as far as it is of British origin and in as far as the British bourgeoisie deems it expedient to insist upon the fulfilment of the French demands.

Just now Hindenburg is trying to breathe and act in the vent-hole of the Anglo-French differences. He lives by three things: by the grace of Chamberlain (not by the "grace of Moscow" as asserted by the *Vorwaerts*), by the present weak-

ness of France on the European continent and by the present neutrality of the American imperialism which allows the differences between Great Britain and France to deepen gradually.

Three days after the election the Chancellor of the Reich, Luther (not Stressemann!) made a speech at the German industry and trade congress which gives Hindenburg's foreign programme. He limited himself to two practical points: the question of security and the question of evacuation. Thus Hindenburg renews Stressemann's proposal of a guarantee pact with the Entente Powers and in return renounces, as a first success, the evacuation of the Cologne occupation zone by the British. The next stage will be Germany's entry into the League of Nations, and then as a more remote aim—the proposal of intervention against the Soviet Union for which preparations are already proceeding with Great Britain's assent.

But just as the whole future of the German appendix-imperialism is fraught with difficulties, there are also difficulties in the way of the very first steps of Hindenburg's foreign policy. It is in the interests of French imperialism to fight against the liquidation of the Versailles Peace Treaty, and it has also the power to do so. Briand, who was the French representative in the League of Nations, and is an expert for Rhineland questions does not raise any objections in principle against a guarantee pact, but he wants this guarantee pact to include paragraph 44 of the Versailles Peace Treaty which contains the well-known neutralisation decisions for the Rhineland. Here arises the first difficulty.

It would be utterly wrong to imagine that Hindenburg's foreign policy (1) is nothing new, and (2) that it can be carried out without adding to the difficulties and conflicts. The events which took place immediately after his election showed already the contrary.

The best illustration of the character of Hindenburg's "national Realpolitik" in the near future is to be found in the *Kölnische Zeitung*, in its comment on Luther's speech:

"What he wants to carry on is, national Realpolitik, in the best sense of the word, which will fulfil Germany's heavy treaty obligations step by step but always within the limits of possibility, and which will defend Germany's rights and will endeavour to extend them as far as this is possible at present."

4. General Dawes' General.

During the election struggle a dispute a dispute raged between the Republican people's bloc and the Monarchist Reich bloc concerning the question of Hindenburg's election would meet with approval or disapproval abroad. As it happened, both was the case. After the election democratic newspapers published triumphantly extracts from the French press which received Hindenburg's election with indignation. At the same time Monarchist papers published long reports from the British press which took up "a wise wait and see" attitude with respect to Hindenburg's election.

For a few days there were threats from America about stopping credits. But hitherto nothing of the kind has happened.

Foreign countries, namely the imperialist governments are much more honest in their adoption of Hindenburg than Hindenburg in the adoption of the German Republic. The French bourgeoisie is in this respect the only exception.

Generally speaking, the imperialists of all countries look upon Hindenburg as the general field-marshall who carries out general Dawes' Plan of attack on the German proletariat. The Monarchist executive power offers to foreign capital a better guarantee for its German interests than the parliamentary State apparatus of the bourgeois republic.

The end of the current year will also see the end of the first period of the Dawes' regime—the period which gave breathing time and recuperation, the period of small deficits and great great stabilisation. The first payments will have to be made. The golden youth period of the Dawes Plan is succeeded by the iron ten-hour working day. It is only the disillusionments of the petty bourgeoisie which will be restored. The reigning monarchy greets the people with a mighty bouquet of taxes. It presents to the workers and small peasants corn tariffs which eclipse all memories of the old Kaiser epoch.

There is no doubt whatever that these consequences of the Dawes' regime will stir up economic struggles on a large scale in Germany. But the imperialist governments are in serious doubt if the bourgeois republic is capable to intervene in these economic struggles in such a way as to beat down

the working class. This task falls now to General Hindenburg.

This is a more comprehensive reason for the "wise wait and see" attitude with which especially the British press received the election. *The Times* wrote as follows on April 30th :

"In as far as the election expresses the mood of the German people, it must be taken fully into account. In many respects this fact is disturbing, but it certainly is of the utmost importance for European politics."

(Translated from the German.)

The *Daily Express* (by no means an ultra-Conservative organ) is much more precise. It headed its announcement, "Hindenburg not a Junker"—in German: not an undesirable president for the British imperialism.

But more explicit still is the *Daily Mail*, as well as the entire Rothermere press :

"Hindenburg's victory means a heavy blow for Bolshevism. In any case Hindenburg is not a hotspur like Ludendorff. It is only to be hoped that if Germany is really to have a monarch sooner or later, the latter will not be as bloodthirsty as the last."

(Translated from the German.)

Thus the new monarch, whose ascension to the throne Hindenburg is preparing, is not only Christian, national and social, but in accordance with the wish of the British imperialists, he is also like the inventor of the well-known corn cure: Dr. Unblutig (unbloody).

5. Republic and Monarchy.

The more clever section of the Hindenburg press is at present engaged in denying, as far as this is possible, or in throwing a veil over the definite political changes which Hindenburg's election is bound to bring about. The monarchists hope to draw thereby to themselves larger sections of the bourgeois parties and to pacify the suspicious elements abroad. Luther announced already in his speech the "law of continuity" in the foreign policy. The *Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung*, the organ of the heavy industry, condemned

immediately after April 26th, "the foolish talk about Monarchs being pitted against Republicans at this election."

No Communist will allow himself to be deluded by these clumsy tactics. There is no doubt whatever that we have to deal not only with a Monarchist peril, but already with a real Monarchist restoration. This Monarchism does not only exist in the general sense, namely, in the form of Monarchist permeation of the State apparatus, the army, etc., but it already exists in the narrow dynastic sense of the Hohenzollern monarchy whose official representative is Hindenburg.

To-day monarch is identical with the objective class interests of the German big bourgeoisie.

For their "national Realpolitik" and for the establishment of the new German appendix-imperialism, the German capitalists require a Monarchist government with a strong military basis capable of acting without parliamentary interference in the vent-hole of the Anglo-French differences.

In his letter to Bernstein, Engels pointed out towards the end of his life that the constitutional monarchy (namely, the Hindenburg-Hohenzollern "People's Kaiser government") will become during two historical epochs the most expedient form of bourgeois domination: firstly, as long as feudalism is not yet fully overcome, that is to say, as long as a certain equilibrium still exists between the bourgeoisie and the Junkers. Secondly: as soon as the bourgeois Republic becomes "too dangerous" because of the political and organisational progress of the proletariat, "too dangerous" meaning too weak to hold down the working class, that is to say, as soon as a relative equilibrium is again established between the class forces, but this time not between the bourgeoisie and feudalism, but between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. In the interval is the period of unrestricted bourgeois domination which is no longer endangered by feudalism, and is not yet in peril at the hands of the proletariat. The Democratic Republic is for the bourgeoisie the most convenient form of government in this period.

This statement of Engels, which was only published last year by Riasanov, is of the greatest importance. In it he foresaw on the strength of the development of the Bismarck Germany in the period of the Socialist law, a historic change in the functions of the monarchy, which for a long time was

not perceived by the Marxists. In West Europe, monarchy was for many years looked upon as an obsolete heritage of the feudal epoch which could not become a real peril for the proletariat within the modern capitalist development. The German Social-Democrats whose Erfurt programme does not contain a single word about a republic, gave up almost entirely anti-monarchist agitation among the masses. The latest imperialist development since the world war is a brilliant confirmation of Engels' prophecy. The strengthening and revolutionisation of the proletariat, its severance from the opportunist workers' aristocracy, the dawn of the first period of the proletarian world revolution, the going over of large sections of the peasantry and of the oppressed nations and colonial peoples to the side of the proletariat—all this makes the democratic republic "dangerous" for bourgeois domination. The "equilibrium" undergoes a change. The imperialist bourgeoisie needs a thorough re-organisation of its State power, in order to prevent the revulsion of this changed equilibrium and the victory of the proletariat. Therefore, it is making in a number of countries attempts at a monarchist restoration.

In this sense Hindenburg's election is an event of far-reaching historical importance, not only for Germany, but also for France, America and the as yet "democratic" British monarchy, etc.

The tactics which the German Communists gradually introduce into their struggle against the monarchy, are so to speak, only the prelude of a political question with which sooner or later most of the other Parties of the Comintern and the International as a whole will be confronted.

Hindenburg's election could be designated as the extreme point of the first proletarian revolution in Germany. It is only now that bourgeoisie draws the last logical conclusion from it. After the Saxon October retreat in 1923, the bourgeoisie got the best of the proletariat with the help of the emergency legislation and of the Reichswehr. This was only the first step. In the summer of 1924 the bourgeoisie signed the Dawes Plan, and laid thereby the foundation for the capitalist consolidation, but this too was not all. It is only with Hindenburg's election in April, 1925, that the bourgeoisie went definitely over from consolidation in the form of a bourgeois Republic to Monarchist consolidation.

But the question arises how is it that the Republic is becoming "too dangerous" just now when the proletariat is

as downtrodden and passive as never before? The bourgeoisie just shows thereby that it is more thorough, more far-seeing, and more conscious of its class aims, than many good revolutionists. It does not only draw from the German revolution the lesson that the proletariat was passive, undecided, unorganised, and allowed itself to be beaten, but it studies at the same time the positive balance of the period from 1918 to 1923: the power and the danger. It is not satisfied with the fact that the working class is to-day beaten and powerless, but wants at the same time to have a guarantee against the inevitable future advance of the proletariat. The cleverest brains among the German bourgeoisie do not make themselves to-day any illusions on the present illusion of the German working class. They reckon—sooner or later, after many years or in a decade—with the second proletarian revolution in Germany. They know that the present weakness of the working class is only temporary, that its passivity will not last, and that its tiredness of revolution is only a passing phase. And they know above all, that a second real proletarian revolution will be too much for this republic which required five years desperate fighting to resist the first.

The Monarchist struggle against the bourgeois republic is at the same time the struggle of the big bourgeoisie for the elimination of social-democracy and of the trade unions. The Social-Democratic leaders have shown to the revolutionary workers in the six years of revolution that they are the obedient servants of the bourgeoisie. They required as much time to show to the bourgeoisie that they are not an absolute guarantee against revolution. That is why the big bourgeoisie has to remove Social-Democratic influence from the German State apparatus. If it is to achieve an adequate application of the Dawes Plan. Social-Democracy has done its duty to the workers, it can no longer do any service to the Monarchist restoration.

The elimination of the Social-Democracy is after Hindenburg's election the decisive bone of contention between the bourgeois monarchy and the bourgeois republic. The Social-Democrats were gradually pushed into the background all through the existence of the Republic according to an almost consecutive plan. In 1918: the purely Social-Democratic government of people's deputies. In 1919: coalition with bourgeois Republicans under Social-Democratic leadership. 1921: coalition with the bourgeois Republicans under bourgeois leadership. In 1923: big coalition with the

Monarchist people's parties. After the October events of 1923, expulsion from the big coalition. Since January 16th, 1925, government of the bourgeois bloc under nationalist leadership. In April, 1925, Hindenburg assumes power as Monarchist president of the Reich. A week later the restoration renews the attack on the last bulwark of the Social-Democracy in Germany: the Prussian Government, the Prussian executive apparatus of the German bourgeois State. But the Prussian government was not brought to a fall by this first onslaught, because a section of the Monarchists arrived at a final compromise with the Social-Democrats.

This event shows that the elimination of the Social-Democrats from the bourgeois State apparatus is meeting with difficulties. It is these difficulties which prevented hitherto the formation of a steadfast bourgeois bloc under the ægis of capitalist stabilisation. **The big bourgeoisie cannot eliminate the Social-Democrats openly.** Germany is not Bulgaria. Even Zankoff cannot reign even for a time against the will of all the workers and peasants without the accompaniment of exploding infernal machines. In a developed industrial State such as Germany, this method is impossible. German big capital can only make its economic stabilisation politically secure by winning over a large section of the working class, and by creating at the same time a maximum of powerful guarantees against a second revolution. But the first condition cancels the second. The first is only possible with the help of the Social-Democrats, the second only at the cost of their elimination. This contradiction shows at present the insecurity of the bourgeois restoration in Germany; in spite of the October defeat, of the Dawes Plan and in spite of Hindenburg.

The struggle between the monarchy and the bourgeois république, between the right bloc and the people's bloc, is at the same time the struggle for the abolition or the continuation of the alliance with the Social-Democrats. The centre and the Democrats, the two bourgeois people's bloc parties, are in fact, already component parts of the bourgeois bloc. But in Prussia, they cannot sever from the Social-Democrats. The Centre is the greatest sufferer from this anomaly. If it gives up for good and all coalition with the Social-Democrats, it risks a breach with the 1,270,000 workers and civil servants organised in the Christian trade unions. At the same time the employers' wing drives the Centre towards the bourgeois bloc. These differences can lead to a Party split, they paralyse already the only real mass party of the

German bourgeoisie. In the Reich, the Centre supports since January 16th, 1925; the Government of the Monarchist bourgeois bloc. In national governments such as Hesse, it is still in the small coalition with the Social-Democrats, and in Prussia it is vainly striving for a big coalition. In Hamburg again the Monarchist people's party is obliged to keep up the coalition with the Social-Democrats, because the Hamburg employers cannot make a stand against the powerful and restless working class without the help of the Social-Democrats.

Thus the question: monarchy or republic is insolubly bound up with the question of Social-Democracy.

6. The Social-Democrats,

The Social-Democrats got the best of the fight for the Soviet Republic with the weapon of civil war. It does not want, neither is it able to carry on a serious defensive struggle for the bourgeois Republic against the Monarchists. But "Social-Democracy" is a wide term. There is a difference between the Party leaders, the party bureaucrats, the consciously counter-revolutionary cadres of officials, the narrow circle of the actual workers' aristocracy and the rank and file of the party, to whom must be added millions of honest proletarian voters and adherents of the Social-Democrats—the periphery. These sections of the working class are at present not at all inclined to fight against the monarchy. They are encouraged in this attitude by the sabotage of the party leaders. Hence the necessity to detach large sections of Social-Democratic workers from their party, if the struggle against the monarchy is to be really carried out. This process cannot, however, be affected in the not only primitive, but also opportunist manner adopted by Brandler in 1923: coalition with a few supposedly "left" leaders of social-democracy, accompanied by liquidation of the independent policy of the Communist Party. These Brandler tactics did not, as everyone knows, detach the Social-Democratic workers from their Party. On the contrary, they consolidated the Social-Democratic Party, they caused the defeat of the revolution and they detached temporarily, the disillusioned masses from the Communists.

If larger sections of Social-Democratic workers are to be brought over to our side, that is to say, if the pre-re

quisite for a real fight against monarchism is to be established, two things are necessary : (1) that the C.P.G. instead of liquidating or relaxing its independent policy, should develop and strengthen it to the utmost ; (2) that it should know how to deepen and to make use of the objective breach which exists between the Social-Democrats and the bourgeois people's bloc parties. The same should be done with respect to the serious breach between the people's bloc and the monarchist bloc. These dissensions should be converted into **class differences and class struggles**.

Adherence to our independent Communist policy means—that we do not (like Bandler) renounce our fundamental Communist ultimate demands, and that we issue partial demands and everyday slogans which do not relax the tension of the class differences, but make it more acute, which do not lower the level of the workers, but raise it. Bandler's opportunism consisted not only in the liquidation of the ultimate slogans of Communism and of the concrete fighting slogan of the dictatorship of the proletariat (which was in accord with the situation in the autumn of 1923), but above all, in the renouncement, for the benefit of his coalition with the left Social-Democrats of the Zeigner type even of the immediate partial demands and everyday slogans, which at that time, would have driven the masses forward, be it only a few steps. In other words : we, the left, Bolshevik C.P.G., differ, from Bandler's right, opportunist C.P.G. not because Bandler manoeuvred with the Social-Democrats, and because we refused to do so, but because Bandler went in for Menshevik manœuvring with the Social-Democratic leaders, which was tantamount to the Communist Party's self-limitation and to a limitation of the objectively possible extension of the class struggle, whilst we ought to manoeuvre in a Bolshevik manner with the Social-Democrats, and under certain circumstances, even with other bourgeois parties, in order to bring the Communist Party of Germany into closer contact with the proletarian millions and with all workers as **the independent** leader in their struggle, and in order to accelerate and encourage the class struggle by making use of all breaches in the enemy camp.

Active intervention in the discussions between bourgeois Republic and Monarchy makes it incumbent on us to drive a wedge into the German social-democracy, to detach the Social-Democratic masses from the opportunist (right and "left") leaders and to organise in Germany a movement which should, with certain differences, compare with the

British Labour movement. One of these differences is—that we in Germany will not achieve as rapid and brilliant successes as the British Communists. We lack in our country the grave and acute convulsion through which British imperialism is passing. Our work will be more difficult, more laborious and more complicated than in other countries.

What complicates our tasks in the struggle against social-democracy is above all—that we have to make use of a considerable number of "breaches" in the enemy camp, and that we cannot deepen one breach without at the same making the other more acute. From a schematic viewpoint, one can say that there are three big "breaches" within the bourgeoisie and its Social-Democratic appendix : (1) between the right bloc and the people's bloc ; (2) between bourgeois and Social-Democratic elements in the people's bloc ; (3) between the "left mood" workers and the right leaders within the social-democracy.

To accelerate the crisis within the social-democracy, which is the most important for us, we must accelerate the crisis in the people's bloc. To deepen the crisis in the people's bloc, we must make the differences between the people's bloc and the right bloc more acute. Thus, we can see that to enlist the sympathy of large sections of Social-Democratic workers for Communist policy, our Party will have to carry out a whole series of broadly planned, well thought-out manœuvres, which will certainly be dangerous, but absolutely essential.

In spite of its unexpectedly strong influence over the proletariat, social-democracy comes out of the election struggle doubly beaten. It is beaten because, in spite of its treacherous tactics and in spite of the withdrawal of its own party candidate in favour of Marx, the "Republican" priest and reactionary, Hindenburg and the monarchy were victorious. It is doubly beaten because its policy has brought about, in addition to the defeat at the front, a certain amount of rebellion in the "Hinterland," great dissatisfaction in its own ranks.

Already now, eighteen months after the Zeigner catastrophe and a few weeks after the Hindenburg election, the dissatisfaction of the Social-Democratic workers is finding again **organised** expression in the form of three different groupings : the Saxon districts, the Reichsbanner and the free thinkers. These three phenomena are quite independent

of each other—in Saxony the Reichsbanner is very weak, the free thinkers have hitherto taken little interest in politics—therefore, it cannot be said that they are accidental. The Saxon districts are dissatisfied with the coalition policy of the Party leaders. The freethinkers are rebelling against the election of Marx who is the president of the Catholic Congress. The workers in the Reichsbanner grumble at the castration of the struggle against the armed black-white-and-red bands and begin to get into touch with the Red Front Fighters' Bund. In all three cases it is as yet a question of instinctive workers' opposition which has not yet found a conscious political expression. Who can provide these workers with a political aim and concrete slogans? People of the type of Paul Levi and Kurt Rosenfeld? Certainly not! Only the C.P.G. is able to free these very serious tendencies among the Social-Democratic workers from their opportunist "Saxon" bonds, to give them a political lead and to direct them towards the class aims of the proletariat in the present political situation of Germany.

This is the task which the Party has set itself. It sees in it the tactical meaning of its aggressive manœuvres against the monarchy, against the Social-Democratic coalition policy with the black-red-and-gold bourgeoisie, against the Social-Democratic Party and its opportunistic policy.

7. The Communist Party,

After the Hindenburg election, the tactics of the Communists result from the analysis of the situation as a whole. The position of the C.P.G. has become a serious and difficult position after April 26th. The ordinary workers in the industrial enterprises, workers as a whole with the exception of the millions of reactionary and narrow members of the petty bourgeoisie, look upon the Monarchist peril as a political fact which overshadows everything else. The Social-Democratic leaders deny, on the one hand, the seriousness of this peril (with sickly Noske speeches and "radical" Levi phrases) and on the other hand, they try, under the demagogic slogans of struggle for the black-red-and-gold Republic, to bring the passive section of the proletariat still more under their leadership and to bring over to their side even sections of the revolutionary workers from the Communist camp. Their answer to Hindenburg's election is—more energetic struggle, not against Hindenburg, but against the Communists. They have started C.P.G. baiting

of an unprecedented kind, under the pretext that Hindenburg's election is the fault of the C.P.G. There is the following passage in the manifesto of the Managing Committee of the Social-Democratic Party:

"Hindenburg is President by the grace of Moscow.

This must be widely explained to the people."

For a couple of days, the Social-Democrats succeeded in fact, to confuse part of the working class with this demagogic. But already the first measure of the C.P.G., the 'open letter' inviting to united struggle against Hindenburg broke the spell cast upon us.

In view of the present situation, the main task of the German Communists must consist in being in the front of the struggle against Monarchism, and in appearing before the entire working class, before all workers as the only champions against Monarchism.

With respect to this we must not limit ourselves to mere agitation, to a mere verbal exposure of the Social-Democratic betrayers of the working class. Their exposure must be complete. As champion fighters against the monarchy, we must make full use of the Bolshevik tactics of manoeuvring, of utilisation of all differences in the enemy camp, of taking advantage of all opportunities to drive the masses forward.

In connection with the struggle against the monarchy, we must also take the lead and must make more acute all separate and partial struggles of the working class, all political and economic movements, all resistance to the Dawes burdens. Under the cloak of a supposed struggle against the monarchy, which does not in fact take place, the Social-Democrats endeavour to sabotage even with more determination than before the defensive actions of the workers. We must, on the contrary, combine every separate struggle with the struggle waged by the classes as a whole against the monarchy.

Very instructive in both spring election campaigns was the role of the German petty bourgeoisie. It was the decisive factor in Hindenburg's election. The petty bourgeoisie has now as before great weight in the correlation of class forces in Germany. The Hindenburg era is bound to bring before long two great disappointments to its petty bourgeois mid-

wives and camp followers: Hindenburg betrays the **social** expectations of the middle sections of society, he disillusioned millions of urban petty bourgeois elements by the introduction of corn tariffs, he disappoints numerous rentiers and savers with respect to the restoration of the value of bonds, etc. He disappoints the "middle class" as a whole by his taxation policy.

But above all, Hindenburg betrays the **national** expectations of the German petty bourgeoisie. As general of General Dawes he has to deliver Germany to the foreign capitalists. As general of British Imperialism, he is not the marshal's staff of the struggle against Versailles, but the scourge of the German people. Unconditional fulfilment policy is the price paid by the German nationalists for the election of their President. The last bourgeois party, which was at least by words against the Entente, has openly and entirely fallen into line with the Dawes Plan since Hindenburg's candidature. This leaves the Communists as the only party of the national liberation of Germany. They must make this clear to the masses through their policy on the national question.

The C.P.G. gained tens of thousands of votes between the first and the second presidential election. This gain of 60,000 votes does not come from the industrial districts. We lost 82,000 workers' votes in three industrial districts of Berlin, and in the five Rhenish industrial districts, which are exactly compensated by the 82,000 workers' votes gained in the three Saxon districts. The Party's gain of votes comes from the following **agrarian** districts:

Pomerania, 9,400; East Prussia, 5,300; Weser-Ems, 3,800; Coblenz-Trier, 3,200; Liegnitz, 5,000; Thuringia, 8,400.

What do these figures show? They show that we have made progress in the rural districts. We have gained ground in the extreme East of the Reich and also in the Western vine-growing district Coblenz-Trier, although Thalmann's candidature seemed hopeless after the first ballot. One of the most important tasks of the Party is the continuation of the struggle for influence over the peasantry. In our peasant policy we must proceed from mere agitation, Red Sundays in the countryside, legislative proposals in the parliaments, to the great political questions and class struggle which we must connect with the interests of the

poorest peasantry. If we succeed in gaining the initiative in the struggle against the monarchy, we will be able to accelerate in the Monarchist Landbund, the bulwark of the German agrarian reaction, class differences which are bound to crop up sooner or later.

In spite of the enormous difficulty of the situation and in spite of certain shortcomings in our tactics, the C.P.G. has been able to gain 2,000,000 votes for Thalmann's workers' candidature. This is a political and organisational success. The vanguard of the working class, the active nucleus of the German proletariat in the industrial districts is with us. We are and will be the great workers' Party into which we have developed during seven years' hard struggle.

The meaning of the 2,000,000 who voted for Communism is perhaps, even more important for the forthcoming struggle with the monarchy, than the absolute strength of our influence. In the largest working class districts such as Berlin (Potsdam I. and II.), Dusseldorf-East, the Palatinate, Leipsic, Hamburg, neither the black-red-and-gold, nor the black-white-and-red gained an absolute majority. The Communists are the needle-index in the scales between bourgeois Republicans and Monarchists in the Prussian parliament. They can, however (what is a thousand times more important), become the needle-index in the actual class struggle against the monarchy which may initiate a new movement of the German working class. The tactics of manœuvring with bourgeois Republicans against Monarchism is certainly dangerous. It can lead to opportunist digressions if the Party is not ready to act with iron determination. But we would be fools if out of fear of these opportunist perils we allowed ourselves to be "neutralised," as needle-index in the scales between the bourgeois republic and the monarchy.

Brandler manœuvred with the bourgeois republic in order to avoid the struggle for the Soviet Republic. We manœuvre with the bourgeois republic against the monarchy in order to accelerate the struggle for the Soviet Republic. Brandler's manœuvring tactics were not based on an analysis of the real situation, but on illusions. We are free of all illusions as far as the bourgeois republic is concerned. We know that the slogan "la république en danger!" is not raised by the black-red-and-gold parties for the purpose of making a real stand against the monarchy, but for the purpose of misleading the workers. We also know that the

alleged struggle against the monarchy and for the preservation of the republic has been since 1848, frequently a pretext for leading the revolutionary parties into the morass of opportunism. Everyone remembers that Millerand's entry into the capitalist government of Waldeck-Rousseau began as an innocent manœuvre with the bourgeois Republicans. But it would be like a blow in the face of Bolshevism if we were to renounce tactics because they were abused somewhere and sometime by opportunists.

Lenin did not only condemn Millerandists as the betrayers of the working class, he also fought against the foolishness of the "left" Marxist and subsequent social-patriot, Guesde, because the latter declared the Dreyfus affair, the first prelude of the "new monarchy" in imperialist Europe "unimportant for the proletarian class struggle" and rejected any kind of manœuvring with the bourgeois Republicans against the monarchy.

The Hindenburg era places before our Party for the first time on a large scale the task to study Leninism not only from books and historic examples, but to learn to use Leninist tactics in a new and extremely difficult and complicated situation, in a way in keeping with the concreteness of the present German conditions, and also in a way to make the entire working class progress towards our Communist aims.

It is in this sense that the Central Committee of the C.P.G. made its decisions on May 11th, 1925. It is in this sense that our forthcoming Party Congress will finally elaborate the basis of our tactics in the present epoch.

HEINZ NEUMANN (Moscow).

Who Will Lead?

Class Differentiation in the Indian Revolutionary Movement

THE Party of the Cadets is an ephemeral and lifeless Party. This statement may seem paradoxical at a moment when the Cadets are achieving brilliant victories in the elections, when they are standing on the threshold of probably even more brilliant parliamentary victories. . . . The Cadets are not a Party, but a symptom. They are not a political force, but foam rising from the clash of fighting forces mutually more or less counter-balanced Indeed, they are composed of garrulous, boasting, self-satisfied, narrow-minded and cowardly bourgeois intelligentsia. . . ."

Lenin wrote these words after the Revolution of 1905, when the Cadets were rising in power. History has borne out the prophetic nature of these words. In studying the history of the Indian revolutionary struggle, we find it very instructive to draw an analogy between the Swaraj Party and the Cadets as depicted by Lenin. As a matter of fact, the political character and social composition of the Swaraj Party, which, during the last year and a half, dominated the political stage of India, can be equally characterised by these expressions used by Lenin, in analysing the role of the Cadets in Russia. In the same article Lenin compared the Cadets with worms born out of the decayed carcass of Revolution of 1905, and fattening on that carcass. This rather brutal characterisation can also apply to the Swaraj Party—the replica of the Cadets in India. A survey of the genesis and the political accomplishment of the Swaraj Party will justify this historical analogy. This retrospective glance at history is of great importance at this moment, when the Indian movement has reached the end of the period in which it was dominated by petty bourgeois ideology and by the consequent hesitating tactics in spite of its revolutionary mass composition. The lessons learned from the mistakes committed in the past will be greatly helpful in the coming stage of development in which the foundation of the movement is bound to be shifted on to new social

classes, necessitating the crystallisation of new ideology and new organisational forms.

Lenin said that the Party of the Cadets was the growth on the dead body of the Revolution of 1905. Similarly the Swaraj Party rose out of the ruins of a great movement which did not reach such a definite revolutionary climax as the Russian Revolution of 1905, but which was undoubtedly the nearest approach to a revolutionary crisis in India. The collapse of the movement of mass passive resistance commonly known as the Non-Co-operation (or Ghandi) movement, led to the crystallisation of a certain political tendency which found expression in the Swaraj Party. It was the tendency towards liquidating the revolutionary character of the struggle for freedom and bringing the nationalist movement back to the bourgeois politics of reformism.

It should be recollected that the movement led by Ghandi did not suffer a defeat at the hands of external forces. It proved itself to be too powerful for the forces of repression. It succumbed under the weight of its internal contradictions, the heterogeneousness of its social composition, and the weakness of its leadership. In 1921 and 1922 the Nationalist movement became so powerful that the government was thrown into a state of panic. For the first time in the history of the Nationalist movement, the masses of the people were involved in it. The government was so much demoralised by the threatening character of the movement that it was on the point of making large concessions to the Indian bourgeoisie had the latter only had the courage to push a little farther ahead. But this could not be done unless the revolutionary potentialities of the movement were released. The bourgeois leaders, who stood at the head of the movement at that time, however, were not prepared to do this. The threatened overthrow of British imperialism in India, at any rate a serious weakening of its position, was avoided not by a defeat of the Nationalist forces but thanks to the cowardice of the petty bourgeoisie and treachery of the bourgeois intellectuals.

The Non-Co-operation movement was an organised protest against the Reforms of 1919. It embraced all the social elements except those who were directly benefited by the political rights and administrative concessions granted. But these rights and concessions were so insufficient that they touched only a very thin strata of the upper classes—landlords, big capitalists, and higher intellectuals. The object of the British government in granting the Reforms was to

split the Nationalist ranks— to separate the big bourgeoisie from the impending mass revolutionary movement, ominous signs of which were already to be noticed in the latter days of the world war. The Reforms were successful in winning over the support of the upper classes; but their failure to meet the demands of the petty bourgeoisie accentuated the discontent of the latter and drove them towards the masses, who were in a state of revolt owing to higher prices and other forms of economic exploitation. These two social classes embraced by far the majority of the entire population. A movement so constituted was sure to be very powerful. In fact it did appear very much so in the beginning. But the cultural backwardness and utter lack of political education on the part of the masses placed the entire movement under petty bourgeois leadership. Consequently a movement, predominated of mass composition and essentially sustained by the first stages of a gigantic working class revolt, became the political weapon of the petty bourgeoisie.

The petty bourgeois opposition to the inadequate Reforms was crystallised into a movement to boycott the latter. The concessions made were not broad enough to affect the economic conditions and political disabilities of the middle classes. Therefore, the latter declared their intention not to participate in the reformed administration. Once placed on this basis, the Non-Co-operation movement ceased to consciously express the revolutionary forces on which it was essentially based. The widespread discontent of the masses which encouraged the disgruntled petty bourgeoisie to venture upon a resistance to imperialist autocracy was, however, not to subside because the middle class intellectual leaders failed to give it a militant political form. During the year 1920 and 1921 the entire country was the scene of a powerful strike movement on the one hand and a series of agrarian insurrections on the other. In proportion as the revolutionary forces grew powerful the leaders turned against them. This contradiction between the leadership and the movement led to the collapse of the latter.

The Swaraj Party was the outcome of this collapse. The dissatisfied lower middle class drifted into the turmoils of a revolutionary mass movement without properly appreciating the gravity of the steps they were taking. But the upper strata of the middle classes, which were more consciously actuated by bourgeois idealism, had been from the very beginning aware of the revolutionary potentialities of a movement based upon an acute mass discontent. They

knew that a peasant revolt which was imminent on all sides was detrimental to the interests not only of British imperialism but also of native landlordism. They also knew that the rebellious workers employed in the industries could not be mobilised into a movement of national liberation without at the same time becoming conscious of the economic interests of their class, in which case such a movement would be directed as much against British imperialism as against Indian capitalism. Both of these eventualities, namely, an agrarian revolt against native feudalism and a strike movement against capitalism, were odious to those leaders of the Non-Co-operation movement who consciously represented the interests of the Indian bourgeoisie.

The mass movement, which struck terror into the heart of imperialism, was sabotaged, repudiated and finally betrayed by the timid petty bourgeoisie which came under the counter-revolutionary influence of the bourgeoisie in proportion as it went away from the masses. As soon as the petty bourgeoisie committed political suicide, the way was clear for the representatives of the bourgeoisie to liquidate all the revolutionary tendencies in the Nationalist movement. The Swaraj Party gathered under its banner those advanced bourgeois elements who could give a co-ordinated and intelligent expression to the hostility against the revolutionary character of the Nationalist movement. These people began by criticising the Non-Co-operation programme as "impracticable." They argued that the Non-Co-operation movement failed owing to the impracticability of its programme, and concluded that the movement should be given a new programme of "practical politics." The collapse of the movement, however, was not due to any weakness of the programme. On the contrary, it was due to the refusal of the leaders to carry out a programme, although not a few of those very leaders subsequently talked wisely about the impracticability of the revolutionary Non-Co-operation programme in order to justify a reversion to reformism.

The programme of Non-Co-operation was very practical and could be carried out to the great detriment of British Imperialism, had it not been purposely sabotaged by the leaders. It was so practical, that is, it corresponded so much to the objective conditions of the country at that particular epoch, that a very half-hearted propagation of the programme stirred up the masses to a point of revolt. While initiating the campaign for the rejection of the old programme in favour of a new one, C. R. Das (the leader

of the Swaraj Party), condemned the Non-Co-operation leaders for having "bungled and mismanaged the movement when the mightiest government was on its knees." This was the case in 1921 when the Executive Committee of the Indian National Congress, on which sat practically all the present leaders of the Swaraj Party, repudiated all forms of mass resistance and ordered a general retreat. (C. R. Das was in jail at that time.) It is true that the Ghandi-ite leaders became terrified by the forces at their command, and called for a retreat when everything was in favour of a vigorous aggressive action. But it is certainly ridiculous to lay the blame of the defeat at the door of the programme when the leaders consciously sabotaged it. The deplorable collapse of the Non-Co-operation movement was indeed the occasion for a new form of struggle with new ideology and under new leadership. What was needed was to adopt more aggressive tactics in order to make up for the ground lost by the mistakes committed and not a retreat straight on the grounds of reformism as was advocated by the Swaraj Party.

The programme of Non-Co-operation was to make the administration of the country impossible by withholding all popular support. No foreign government can exist in a country unless it can count upon a voluntary or involuntary support of a considerable section of the native population. This being the case, it is quite conceivable that the withdrawal of all such support will make the existence of a foreign government impossible. The principle points of the programme of Non-Co-operation were: (1) to boycott the new parliamentary budget, set up under the Reforms Act of 1919; (2) to boycott the law courts; (3) to boycott government schools; and (4) to boycott the merchandise imported from Britain. All these items of boycott were preparatory to the climax of the programme—to suspend the payment of taxes and to organise mass disobedience of all laws. It was indeed a very practical programme. It was a very revolutionary programme as well. If put into effect, it would give political expression to the discontent of the masses. There could be no weapon more suitable for pulling down the political and economic structure of imperialism.

From the very beginning the bourgeois leaders desired to avoid any step that might lead towards this climax. But the Nationalist movement in the post-war period had acquired a predominantly mass character; therefore, slogans embodying the objective demands of the masses could not be totally left out of the programme. Such demands were put for-

ward but in the vaguest possible form. Though nothing definite was ever said as to when and how the "no tax" campaign would be inaugurated, the very slogan "non-payment of taxes" was attractive enough for the peasantry, heavily weighed down by all kinds of rents and taxes. The poor and exploited agrarian masses quickly caught on to this revolutionary slogan, and the nationalist movement dangerously approached a serious revolutionary crisis. This was enough to satisfy the petty bourgeois intellectuals who immediately changed their position. The cardinal point of the new programme was parliamentary obstruction. The plan was to present a series of demands as soon as the Nationalists would be returned to the parliamentary bodies in a majority. Should the government refuse to grant these demands, a policy of indiscriminate parliamentary obstruction would be undertaken in order to make the administration of the country impossible. On the face of it, this programme sounded very radical. It created new illusions for the petty bourgeois intellectuals, smarting in a prolonged state of inactivity caused by the collapse of the Non-Co-operation movement. For them to contest the elections and to enter the Legislature was not the end. They looked for a new period of active struggle when the government would reject the National Demands. The practical development of this struggle obviously depended on the character of the National Demands. The question was whether the demands would be such that the government would find it necessary to reject them, or they would be so formulated that it would not be impossible to find a *modus vivendi*. The leaders of the Party shrewdly avoided any definite answer to this question. The National demands remained shrouded in radical but vague phrases.

But the parliamentary fireworks failed to come up to their promised grandeur. Owing to the miserably limited franchise, the enthusiasm of the petty bourgeois intellectuals could not make a deep impression upon the results of the election. The enfranchised portion of the population belonged to the landowning and capitalist classes and to the rich peasantry and higher intellectuals directly under the influence of those classes. Fully conscious of this state of affairs, the Swarajist leaders made it quite clear in their programme that the Party stood essentially for the landed and capitalist interests. But the necessity of rallying the petty bourgeois intellectuals rendered it difficult for them to make the point sufficiently clear. The Swaraj Party won a partial victory at the polls. In one province they secured a clear majority, while in the central legislature as well as

in a number of important provinces they commanded a powerful minority. But on the whole, they were not in a position to dictate their terms to the government. This partial victory was a relief to the Swarajist leaders. A greater victory would have been an embarrassment for them. It sounds paradoxical, but such was the case. Because as the circumstances stood they could argue that it was not possible to make the National Demands uncompromising; not commanding an independent majority, they could not carry those demands, and to secure a Nationalist majority for the demands, the latter must be made acceptable to the right-wing parties. A greater parliamentary victory would have embarrassed the Swaraj Party in that in such a case there would be no excuse for not presenting the full National Demands which would certainly be rejected by the government, and the movement will come back to the same old cross-roads, namely, whether to fight with imperialism or to capitulate with it. Since the Swarajists hated to be at these cross-roads, they preferred a partial victory to the complete victory.

Once in the parliament, the Swaraj Party did not delay in showing its class character. It immediately struck up an alliance with the left-wing of the bourgeois Liberals who had all along supported the government. This alliance was made at the sacrifice of the National Demands, heralded to the country in such radical phrases. The demands were moderated till they were acceptable to the bourgeoisie. The final form in which they were presented and carried through the legislature with the help of a section of the right-wing parties, was limited to the recommendation for certain measures in order to reconcile the conflict between the Nationalists on the one hand and the government on the other. But even this much was not granted by the government, which remained unmoved in its powerful obduracy.

Now the Swaraj Party was obliged to make good its second promise—that of inaugurating the tactics of parliamentary obstruction upon the rejection of the National Demands by the government. Then followed a year of parliamentary skirmishes only to culminate in the bankruptcy of the tactics of obstructionism. The Swaraj Party, in alliance with the left-wing Liberals, scored a series of parliamentary victories, of which great political capital was made by them. But for all practical purposes they were of very insignificant importance. Undoubtedly this parliamentary

opposition could be of some political value if it was co-ordinated with organised popular resistance in the country. Had the Swarajists really meant to take up a struggle against imperialist absolutionism, they could have organised such a popular resistance in support of their parliamentary activities. They could have done it because the mass discontent which supplied the dynamic energy to the Non-Co-operation movement was still in existence and could be brought to bear upon the political situation if a suitable expression was found for it. But the very fact that the Swaraj Party was the political crystallisation of the tendencies which from the very beginning had been hostile to any revolutionary developments, precluded it from taking up any serious struggle.

The parliamentary fireworks ended in a political deadlock when the Legislature of two provinces were dismissed by the government for their repeated refusal to pass the budget. There were but two alternatives, namely, to carry the fight into the country or to surrender before the uncompromising attitude of the government. This deadlock brought about a crisis inside the Party. The bourgeois element, consciously representing the interests of the capitalist and landowning classes, pressed upon the necessity of abandoning the tactics of indiscriminate obstruction in favour of coming to terms with the government; while the intellectuals, still partially under petty bourgeois illusions, stuck to their wordy readicalism. But the Party as a whole steadily gravitated to the right since the intellectuals lacked the courage and the desire to insist upon any revolutionary action.

At last the deadlock is nearing its end, and a compromise with imperialism is in sight. After six months of manœuvring with the object of finding a formula by which a surrender to Imperialism can be camouflaged, the Party has openly declared its intention to give up its resistance. In the beginning of April a manifesto over the signature of C. R. Das, the leader of the Party, was issued, in which were laid down the conditions for the Party to give up its parliamentary obstruction and accept office. That is, the protest against the Reforms Act of 1919 is liquidated. This attitude of the Swaraj Party was promptly reciprocated by a very reconciliatory speech by the Secretary of State for India, Lord Birkenhead. In answering questions on the prospects of establishing better relations with the Indian Nationalists, Lord Winterton, the Under-Secretary of State

for India, stated in the House of Commons that a sufficiently favourable atmosphere had been created, and that an invitation to the Nationalist leaders, including Das and even Ghandi to come to England, was no longer out of the question, although it might be more advisable to let the government of India carry on the negotiations.

Now, what is this favourable atmosphere which is so heartily welcomed by the Conservative Government of Britain? The favourable atmosphere consists of the fact that the Swaraj Party, which until recently appeared as the most recalcitrant left-wing of the Nationalist movement, has categorically renounced all programme of a struggle for independence and unequivocally committed itself to the programme of self-government within the British Empire. All the resistance on the part of the Indian bourgeoisie has ceased. What is wanted is a junior partnership in the exploitation of the Indian masses. Imperialism on its side in this period of history finds it necessary to have the Indian bourgeoisie as a willing ally rather than as an element of discord to be watched always and to be handled roughly when necessary. The period of clash between imperialism and native capitalism is closed. The Swaraj Party was the "foam" of this clash, to quote Lenin's telling characterisation of the Cadets. In the coming period of reconciliation there will be hardly any necessity for the existence of such a Party. Henceforth bourgeois nationalism will be expressed through the constitutional channels of his Britannic Majesty's most loyal opposition.

The Swaraj Party started its spectacular career with the promise to "end or mend" the present system of British administration. They certainly cannot claim that they have gone very far towards ending the British domination of India. They have not even made a very serious effort to mend it. The mending has taken place not in the nature of the British government, but in that of bourgeois nationalism.

But now the question is: does this bankruptcy of bourgeois nationalism indicate an end of the struggle for the liberation of the Indian peoples? It certainly does not. It simply means that the struggle against imperialism cannot be carried on to the victory under the leadership of the bourgeoisie. It also means that the nationalist intellectuals may indulge in heroic phrases, but they have not the courage nor the ability to organise and lead the Indian masses in a revolutionary struggle for liberation. But the neces-

sity for the Indian people to liberate themselves from political domination and economic exploitation by British imperialism still remains. The forces of national revolution are not defeated. Only those who stood at the head of the movement up till now have found it profitable to enter into compromise with imperialism rather than to carry on a revolutionary struggle. The anti-imperialist struggle is a historic necessity. It must be carried on, only with the difference that the social foundation of the Nationalist movement will be shifted to a different class. The workers and peasants will not only be the backbone of the nationalist movement in the coming period, they will have to assume the political leadership of the movement as well.

There are very important economic reasons for the political weakness of the Indian bourgeoisie. The basis of pure bourgeois nationalism is the conflict between native capitalism and imperialism. In the present period of capitalist development, this conflict becomes more and more superficial every day. Indian capitalism is so much inter-linked with and dependent upon British imperialism, that a serious political conflict leading up to a revolutionary situation has become practically impossible. The superficial character of purely bourgeois nationalism was envisaged by Lenin already at the Second Congress of the Communist International. In his report on the Colonial Commission he said :

“Certain rapprochement is to be noticed between the bourgeoisies of the exploiting countries and of the colonial countries. Very often, probably in the majority of cases, the bourgeoisie of the subjugated countries, supports the Nationalist movement, but at the same time, in agreement with the imperialist bourgeoisie (that is, together with it), fights against all revolutionary movements and all revolutionary classes.”

This rapprochement indicated by Lenin in 1920 has gone on very far in India. The general crisis of capitalism in the post-war period induced the British bourgeoisie radically to change its colonial policy. It was found out that the pre-war policy of forcing the colonies to remain in a state of industrial backwardness could no longer be maintained. Consequently it was decided that an industrialised India would be of much more value to British imperialism than the agrarian India of the past. The capitalist development of India is thus taking place not in antagonism to British imperialism, but with the sanction

and to the interest of British imperialism. This process of industrialisation renders the Indian bourgeoisie a protege of British imperialism. A protege cannot fight against its protector, although it might not relish its place of inferiority. But this new economic policy of British imperialism, which deprives the Indian bourgeoisie of its insignificant revolutionary character, will, however, accentuate the crystallisation of more numerous and more powerful economic forces. It will quicken the class differentiation, thereby liberating the working class from the ideological domination of the counter-revolutionary bourgeoisie and the reactionary intellectuals. The working class will thus find itself in a position to grow into an independent political force. This process of revolutionising the anti-imperialist struggle will not be so protracted as it appears in view of the present politically backward conditions of the Indian proletariat. The capitulation of the Nationalist bourgeoisie does not by any means remove the fundamental economic causes which make for a chronic discontent among the masses of the population. The bourgeois Nationalists did not give a political expression to this discontent. On the contrary, they did their best to separate the nationalist movement from this fountain-head of revolutionary energy. So the immediate consequence of a compromise between the Indian bourgeoisie and British imperialism will be felt in the development of new forms of anti-imperialist struggle, which will embody the discontent of the toiling masses. In other words, the question of the hegemony of the proletariat in struggle becomes a question of practical politics in the next stages of the revolutionary movement in India.

M. N. ROY.

The Dawes Plan and the Stabilisation of Capitalism

HERE is a concensus of opinion that the Dawes Plan has considerably contributed to the partial stabilisation of capitalism which certainly took place last year. This is correct if one considers the effect which the realisation of the Dawes Plan has had hitherto. But it is not at all correct to reckon on the same effect also in the future application of the Dawes Plan. What has in fact happened is—that hitherto only those effects of the Dawes Plan have made themselves felt which are favourable to capitalism, but that the contrary is bound to take place in the not far distant future. To show that this is so, we intend to give a short recapitulation of the history of the coming into being of the Dawes Plan.

The attempt of French imperialism to secure for itself the payment of reparations by direct seizure of the Ruhr Basin and to destroy the German Reich politically, led to the complete collapse of the German valuta as a result of Germany's resistance which had the secret support of Great Britain. This enriched the upper strata of the German ruling classes, but brought Germany at the same time within reach of a proletarian revolution in the autumn of 1923. After the German bourgeoisie had almost carried out the expropriation of the middle sections of society for its own benefit, it proceeded with the stabilisation of the valuta in good earnest. This became possible through the defeat of the German proletariat in the autumn of 1923. These two facts: the defeat of the proletariat and the stabilisation of the valuta enabled American bourgeoisie, which has superabundance of capital which, in the home country can only be invested at very low interest to make an attempt to invest this capital profitably in Germany, converting the latter economically into a colony of the U.S.A.

But the security of the American capital invested in Germany made it necessary not to jeopardise Germany's capacity to yield interest and profits by another French attack on its resources. It is under such circumstances that the

Dawes Plan came into being. Thus the Dawes Plan had to serve several ends : (1) it had to create favourable conditions for the investment of American capital in Germany, and for guaranteeing these investments against any further French attack ; (2) to place Germany in a position enabling it to pay reparations without the reparation payments causing a collapse of the German valuta ; (3) to handicap the German industry inside Germany through the reparations payments to the extent of preventing it competing in a destructive manner with the industry of Great Britain and France on the world market. We have only to draw a comparison between these aims to recognise their contradictory nature. The Dawes Plan is a clumsily contrived compromise between the interests of the three most important imperialist powers : France, Great Britain and the U.S.A. France is mostly interested in receiving reparation payments from Germany : payments which it badly needs for the establishment of a financial equilibrium and for the regulation of its inter-allied debts. Great Britain is less interested in the receipt of reparation payments. The 22 per cent. participation in the German reparations were not a very important factor in the big budget and the well-regulated finances of Great Britain. Its main interest lies in the German industry not being taxed less than the British industry : that, generally speaking the conditions of the production should not be more favourable in Germany than in Great Britain, in order to protect to a certain extent, the already hard pressed British industry from German competition. For Great Britain the meaning of the world war was certainly the destruction of the dangerous German competition. The U.S.A. are not at all interested in reparation payments and have also very little interest in laying obstacles in the way of the development of the German industry ; all they needed was the establishment of a secure basis for the investment of American capital in Germany.

The Dawes Plan was to do justice to all these demands. It was to stabilise the social order in Germany, it was to secure to France reparation payments and to the U.S.A. interest and profits on the invested capital, and on the other hand it had to protect Great Britain from a too powerful competition on the part of German industry.

It is as clear as daylight that the Dawes Plan cannot fulfil all these conflicting aims. Germany can pay reparations and interest to foreign countries only in the form of

an **export of goods**, and according to the nature of the entire German national economy, only in the form of an export of German manufactured articles, because with the exception of coal Germany cannot export either agricultural or mining raw materials, but has on the contrary to import next year, foodstuffs and raw material to the amount of 1.2 milliards gold marks whilst two years hence it will have to pay 2½ milliards gold marks in reparations as well as interest and profits on the capital invested in Germany. **Therefore Germany must have a big active trade balance**; namely, it must throw a very large quantity of manufactured goods on to the world market. As Germany requires an increased import of raw material for its export of manufactured goods, it should increase its export of manufactured goods in round figures by six milliard gold marks every year. This in connection with the present small demand for manufactured goods on the world market as compared with the existing apparatus of production, would result in an extremely acute competition of the German industry with the industry of Great Britain, France, Belgium and other European industrial countries. All the aims which the Dawes Plan proposes to achieve cannot be possibly carried out. **One must either renounce reparations payments or take into the bargain increased competition of the German industry on the world market.**

All this seems to be perfectly clear, but at the same time it seems to be also out of keeping with the favourable results which the application of the Dawes Plan has had hitherto. Since the application of the Dawes Plan, German economy has in fact become much more stable without producing the above-mentioned consequences of increased competition on the world market.

Nevertheless there is nothing astonishing in this. We are only in the initial stage of the effects of the Dawes Plan, and in this initial stage the effects would be necessarily favourable. **Since the acceptance of the Dawes Plan Germany has obtained considerable foreign credits.*** What is

| | |
|--|--------------------------|
| * The amount of this sum cannot be accurately stated. But we know the amount of some of the items. They are: | |
| Actual Dawes loan with free subscription ... | 800 million gold marks |
| up to the beginning of February, 1925, six | |
| loans accessible to the public in America | 250 " " |
| ("Wirtschaftsdiens" of March 20). | |
| Short term loans (no public subscription) ... | 200 " " |
| Bond purchases (Deutsche Bank 40 millions) | 200 " " |
| Short term trade credits | 300 " " |
| Total ... | 1,750 million gold marks |

the effect of these credits on Germany and on world economy? As only a very small part of these credits reached Germany in the form of gold, these credits mean that goods to the same amount were thrown on the German market by the world market. This means, therefore, that the market possibilities of the other part of the world in Germany were increased to the same amount. In reality this process finds its reflection in the aspect of the German foreign trade which shows great passivity since the realisation of the Dawes Plan. Approximate figures of the passive balance are:

| | | | | | |
|----------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|-----|
| October, 1924 | ... | ... | ... | ... | 240 |
| November, 1924 | ... | ... | ... | ... | 400 |
| December, 1924 | ... | ... | ... | ... | 560 |
| January, 1925 | ... | ... | ... | ... | 600 |
| February, 1925 | ... | ... | ... | ... | 250 |

Germany's increased capacity for demands on the world market, which was the result of the credits, created an artificial improvement of the situation. In Germany itself these credits and the goods which were imported into Germany in connection with them were above all instrumental in circulating capital (for during the inflation period considerable parts of the floating capital was funded, which after the stabilisation resulted in a considerable lack of turnover capital: this lack of turnover capital found its expression in a 100 per cent. rise of yearly interest for loans).

Moreover the stabilisation of the valuta set free the reserve of foreign bills of exchange and banknotes which had accumulated in Germany in the inflation period as means of circulation and reserve state funds. These sums too, were used for purchases of goods abroad and for the re-imbursements of the passive balance of the foreign trade department.

Thus we have seen hitherto only the favourable consequences of the Dawes Plan, a pulling of the German economy and increased purchase of foreign goods by Germany. It goes without saying that this cannot last. The turning point must inevitably come in the near future. When Germany will have spent the first credits it will have to pay interest on the credits which it obtains and to remit the

The estimates of the last items are not very certain, but rather under-estimated than over-estimated. The "Wallstreet Journal" states that in the months of October and November, 1924, loan credits granted by American banks to the Germany industry amounted to over 200 million dollars—840 million gold marks (See Lapinsky: Last Stage of Imperialism, Russian edition, p. 24.)

reparation payments provided for in the Dawes Plan, or at least it will have to show its "good intentions" in this direction. Therefore, it will be compelled to make an attempt to establish an active trade balance, namely, to export more goods and especially more manufactured articles. This increased export will have to amount to several milliards every year if payments are to be made to foreign countries. When the time for this turning point will have come, the picture presented by the Dawes Plan and its effect on European capitalism will undergo a sudden change. Instead of absorbing a surplus of goods from the world market, Germany will throw a surplus of goods on to the world market and will thereby make the crisis of the West European industrial countries and the unemployment question connected with it more acute.

Of course, it is not out of the question that Germany will not be able to pay any or only very small reparations. We think that this is most probable. The Dawes Plan provides for reparation payments on the condition that these payments do not differentiate the German valuta. To secure this the artful transfer system was created. This means that the necessary sums for the reparation payments are deducted by the German government from the yearly world production of the German people and deposited in German marks in the Reichsbank to the reparation account, but that the transfer of these sums abroad can only be effected in such a way as not to depreciate the German mark. One can easily assume that the German capitalists will always be able to maintain the German mark on the borders of stability by skilfully concealed investments abroad. Thereby every attempt of a transference on a larger scale would inevitably lead to a depreciation of the German valuta. The German capitalists are all the more interested in such a procedure as the amounts deposited in the Reichsbank to the reparation account are loaned to German capitalists. Moreover, one should also take into consideration that according to the Dawes Plan, not more than one milliard marks ready money is allowed to be accumulated in the Reichsbank, and not more than five milliards worth of German securities can be invested. As soon as these limits are reached payments into the Reichsbank cease automatically: reparation payments are inhibited. This leads us to assume that a real transference will not take place: in any case not to the extent foreseen by the Dawes Plan and required for the establishment of an equilibrium in the French state economy.

In this respect too the clash of interests between the imperialist powers will grow more acute. For America, there is an opportunity to convert the sums accumulated in Germany to the reparation account into American capital by a sham transference. The procedure would be as follows: American capitalists buy shares of German industrial enterprises, also house property and real estate in Germany. They effect these purchases in German marks by exchanging dollars for the sums deposited in marks to the reparation account in the Reichsbank. Thereby, from a purely financial viewpoint the transfer is effected. German marks are converted into American dollars. But from the economic viewpoint the transfer has not actually taken place, as no values have left German territory in the form of reparation payments. The success of this transaction would mean that German investments would become stronger and stronger in Germany and that the economic dependence of Germany on America would also become stronger in consequence. This of course, would not go on for ever, and sooner or later a time will come when the interest on this American capital together with the reparations will have to be paid. This will be the time when Germany will again approach the Entente with the proposal of a further reduction of the reparation payments.*

We can see from all this that the Dawes Plan when put into practice will have a very different effect than it was originally assumed.

We said before that the influence which the Dawes Plan is bound to have abroad has not yet made itself felt. This is not quite correct in as far as its effects are already be-

* How great Germany's dependence on American capital is already is shown by an article in one of the big American periodicals "The Annalist," of March 9th, 1925. In connection with the rehabilitation of mortgages, etc., in Germany, it is asserted in the article, that such a rehabilitation concerns very closely the interests of the American creditors. This applies to the holders of the Dawes loan as well as to the private creditors before Thyssen, the A.E.G. (General Electrical Company), Forts or any other big industrial concern can get a cent in New York, it must present a balance sheet which among other things must also state the amount of obligations and mortgage debts. These balance sheets were based on the rehabilitation order of 14/2/24, according to which the pre-war gold mortgages and obligations, which were repaid in depreciated paper money seemed to be definitely dead, whilst those which are not yet repaid were estimated at 15 per cent. of the original amount in gold. Should Dr. Luther, give way to the creditors and raise these 15 per cent. to 30 per cent., the new foreign credits would suffer by it, the balances would be found to be erroneous, etc.

ginning to make themselves felt. As German economy improves, the pressure of the German industry on the adjoining countries increases more and more. This is particularly the case in the heavy industry. Coal production and coal export in Great Britain have decreased in 1924 exactly by the amount to which production in Germany has increased. The same applies to the iron and steel industry. This effect of the Dawes Plan is beginning to spread also to other branches of industry. Considerable stir was created by the fact that a few weeks ago a big shipyard in Great Britain placed an order in Germany for six new motor boats with a displacement of 10,000 tons. The difference between the estimate of the German yards and the British was enormous: £60,000 per boat. Considering the serious situation in British shipbuilding—31 per cent. of British shipbuilding companies are still without orders—this news caused considerable alarm in Great Britain. The entire British capitalist press published for days long articles on this affair. A joint conference of British shipbuilders and workers engaged in the shipbuilding trade was convened recently to discuss the situation in the British shipbuilding trade.

Everyone knows what it means when capitalists of some branch of industry invite the workers to such a conference. It means: you must either accept lower wages or consent to longer working hours, or do more work in the same time. This is the meaning of every joint conference of this kind. In other words, the fact that the long working hours and lower wages of the German workers necessitated by reparation payments is being used by the capitalists of all the rival-like countries in the direction of forcing on their own workers similar working conditions on the plea that this is the only remedy for unemployment. The former Minister in the British Labour Government, Wheatley, brought this point home most emphatically in a recent number of the Glasgow *Forward*.

Wheatley presents the case certainly in a rather exaggerated agitational form, but in substance his statement tallies with the facts. The attempt to carry out the Dawes Plan means above all the lowering of the conditions of life of the workers who are competing with Germany.

Naturally this is not a solution for the series of crises which are convulsing the West-European industrial countries. If by bringing down the cost of production in the

other countries to the German level, manufactured articles find a readier sale, this does not at all mean that the problem of the over-industrialisation of Western Europe has been solved. Individual capitalists naturally put down their failure to dispose of their goods to the low cost of production of their competitors. But for the capitalist class as a whole, the reduction of wages produces certainly increased surplus value, but not a possibility to bring together the surplus centres of production and the enormous armies of unemployed; nor to increase production, because for a long time to come no demand can be foreseen for the production of the entire productive apparatus. (After a time certain adjustments will take place, at the price of terrible suffering and privations for the European industrial workers: unemployment, emigration, reversion to agriculture, etc., provided the ever-growing clash of class interests does not bring about a revolution before that.)

One can easily foresee that by their endeavour to bring down the existence level of all the workers to the level of the German workers the capitalists will let loose class struggle on a large scale. But even in the event of the victory being on their side in these struggles, the problem will not be solved. They will, therefore, sooner or later adopt the means which have always been adopted by imperialists in such cases. They will endeavour to settle by force of arms whose shall be the world market which has become too small for all of them together. In spite of the disarmament farce, and the League of Nations swindle, new imperialist struggles can be foreseen on this basis.

There is, therefore, no reason to suppose that the satisfactory effect which the Dawes Plan has had **hitherto** will be lasting and definite, and that the Dawes Plan is an important element of the stabilisation of capitalism. The con-Dawes Plan is imminent. From being an element of stabilisation, the Dawes Plan will soon become an element of unrest, of increased acuteness of the class struggle and of imperialist differences.

E. VARGA.

Class Divisions in the United States

AN analysis of the class divisions in the United States is timely and instructive for two special reasons at this moment. The world war has destroyed the last shreds of the "happy isolation" that American capitalism once boasted of. The rapid development of Yankee imperialism within the last decade has made the conditions of the United States and those of the rest of the world more closely inter-dependent than ever before. Hence, the rapidly crystallising re-alignment of classes, of political forces, in the United States assumes to-day a paramount international significance.

A Cross-Section of America,

Since the United States is the world's leading financial and industrial country, many tend to have a distorted picture of the proportions of its urban and rural populations and its class composition. It was not until 1920 that the American census showed a majority of the population residing in cities and towns of 2,500 or more inhabitants. In 1920 the census reports disclosed that 51.4 per cent. of the total population, 54,304,603 was urban and 48.6 per cent. or 51,406,017 was rural. Even to-day, there are only fourteen out of the forty-eight American States the majority of whose population is urban.

But with the rapid American industrial progress the tendency towards the majority of the population in the United States being urban has become marked in recent years. In the last decade, America's urban population has increased 28.8 per cent. and its rural population only 3.2 per cent. The severe agricultural depression which the United States has been experiencing in the last five years is strengthening this tendency considerably. In 1922 alone there was a net migration of 1,200,000 from the country to the cities, largely

because of the dire economic straits in which the farmers found themselves.

The Gainfully Employed Population,

According to the 1920 census there are in the United States, 41,614,248 persons, ten years of age and over, engaged in gainful occupations. This marks an increase of slightly more than 9 per cent. over the total gainfully employed in 1910. The persons engaged in gainful occupations now constitute 39.4 per cent. of the total population.

If we examine the distribution of the gainfully employed we find that there are 12,818,524 engaged in the manufacturing and mechanical industries; 10,953,158 in agriculture, forestry and animal husbandry; 1,090,223 in the extraction of minerals; 3,063,582 in transportation; 3,126,541 in clerical occupations and the remainder in trade, professional, domestic and personal service, and public service.

The Trend of Industrialisation,

In the last decade America's population increased 15.6 per cent. At the same time the persons engaged in manufacturing industries increased 31.6 per cent., and those engaged in agriculture decreased 13.5 per cent.

An examination of this tendency over a longer period of years is illuminating. Since 1870 there has been a steady decrease in the proportion of those gainfully employed in agriculture. In 1900, 35.7 per cent. of the total gainfully employed were found in agriculture. In 1910 the proportion fell to 33.2 per cent.; and in 1920 it declined to 26.3 per cent. With the continuous development of capitalism, there came not only the start of huge industrial establishments drawing the farming population to the cities, but also the end of free land.

Production in American industry has been taking on an ever-greater social character and more resorting to the use of highly-developed labour-saving machinery. But in this respect American agriculture has been lagging far behind. The development of labour saving machinery in agriculture has been limited by the individual production which prevails in American agriculture—the individual farm unit. The

world war has only increased the gap between the development of efficiency and organisation in American agriculture and industry. Thus the individual farmer is growing increasingly helpless before the powerful bankers and manufacturers who are more and more securing a stranglehold on the land as well as the means of production and exchange. The increasing proportion of deserted habitable farmhouses, the rising migration from the country to the cities, the mounting rural bankruptcy figures are further eloquent testimony of the proletarianisation of the farming masses and of their consequent exodus to the industrial centres.

From 1910 to 1920 the number gainfully employed in agriculture decreased 1,705,924. In this period the number gainfully employed in the manufacturing and mechanical industries, extraction of minerals, transportation and clerical occupations increased 4,130,497.

The proportion of persons engaged in manufacturing and mechanical industries rose from 22.5 per cent. in 1900 to 27.8 per cent. in 1910 and 30.8 per cent. in 1920. In transportation the proportion of gainfully employed rose from 6.9 per cent. in 1910 to 7.4 per cent. in 1920; in mining and quarrying from 2.5 per cent. to 2.6 per cent.; and in the clerical occupations from 1,737,053, or 4.6 per cent. of the total gainfully employed in 1910, to 3,126,541 (7.5 per cent.) in 1920. The development of large-scale production and vast systems of exchange tends to create a need for clerical help and primarily accounts for the increase in the last category of the gainfully employed population.

The Tendency Towards Proletarianisation.

The gigantic strides made by the United States in its industrial development have brought in their wake numerous changes in the class composition of American society.

Recent years have seen a positive rise in the numerical strength of wage-earners. From 1910 to 1920 the total number of wage-earners—manual and clerical—rose from 22,406,714 to 26,080,689—an increase of 3,673,975. To-day these elements constitute 62.7 per cent. or the decisive majority of those gainfully employed. These are the wage-earners engaged in the manufacturing industries, extraction of minerals, building trades, transportation, as stationary engineers and stationary firemen, in trade, clerical occupations, as agricultural workers, etc. In 1910 these elements

constituted only 58.7 per cent. of the total gainfully employed.

Of these wage-earners the industrial proletariat forms the largest and the constantly growing section. The United States census shows that the *industrial proletariat*—the wage earners in mining and quarries, manufacturing, building trades, transportation and stationary engineers and firemen increased from 12,800,325 in 1910 to 15,540,486 in 1920. Within this decade the proportion of the total gainfully employed which was found in the ranks of the industrial proletariat mounted from 33.5 per cent. to 37.3 per cent. To-day, the industrial proletariat is nearly sixty per cent. (59.5) of the whole wage-earning group. In the preceding census year the industrial proletariat was 57.1 per cent. of the wage earning masses.

While the industrial proletariat has been increasing, the agricultural proletariat—the farm-labourers hiring out—has been decreasing *absolutely and relatively*. From 1910 to 1920 the agricultural workers decreased from 3,143,773 (8.2 per cent. of the total gainfully employed) to 2,500,612 or 5.2 per cent.

Similarly, the wage-earners engaged in domestic and personal services have been decreasing absolutely as well as relatively. In the period 1910-1920 such wage-earners declined in number and percentage from 3,185,907 (8.3 per cent.) to 2,902,955 (6.9 per cent.) of all those gainfully employed. These wage earners like the agricultural workers are steadily being absorbed into the ranks of the industrial proletariat. Such wage-earners seldom become clerical workers or small business men.

And a consideration of the non-wage earning elements reveals further instructive evidence of the changes in the class alignments in the United States. The group of employers and self-employed among whom are to be found the farm-owners, the manufacturers, bankers, railroad magnates, merchants, etc., has also fallen absolutely and relatively in the last census period. In the years 1910 to 1920 this group engaged in gainful occupations decreased from 13,175,711 (34.7 per cent.) to 11,974,369 (28.8 per cent. of the total gainfully employed). Here we have a loss of 1,201,342 in the decade. The heaviest casualties in this group were suffered by the farm-owners and the capitalists in the manufacturing and mechanical industries. The num-

ber of the latter (the bourgeoisie) fell from 989,395 in 1910 to 652,308 in 1920—a loss of 337,088 in the period.

Concurrently with the development of industry and the growth of the industrial proletariat, the number of salaried professional and supervisory persons increases for a certain length of time. The technical experts, chemists, mining engineers, transportation directors, farm managers, physicians, certain types of middle-men, etc., constituting this section of the gainfully employed have increased from 2,482,478 (6.5 per cent.) in 1910 to 3,540,608 (8.5 per cent.) in 1920. It must be remembered that in this group there is also to be found the "public service" section—largely the government officials. The trend towards industrialisation and proletarianisation with a consequent sharpening of the class conflicts brings with it the rise of a *towering* governmental bureaucracy—a huge state apparatus to be used by the bourgeoisie against the workers. This "public service" section rose from 476,347 in 1910 to 801,826 in 1920—an increase of 325,479 or 68.3 per cent.

Conclusion,

The development of America's gigantic industrial machine has naturally served as the basis for the rise of a big, and *definitely crystallised* working class.

The marked tendencies towards industrialisation and the proletarianisation of the farming masses are serving to increase steadily and rapidly the *urban population* of the United States.

While the gainfully employed population is increasing at a slower rate than the general population, *the industrial proletariat is increasing at a faster rate than the general population*. This sharp trend towards proletarianisation of the country is of tremendous significance. Side by side with the growth of the industrial proletariat there has grown a tremendous army of the *government* bureaucracy—a huge centralised state apparatus with a powerful army, national guard, officers' training corps, navy and naval militia. Both of these tendencies are manifestations of sharpening class divisions in the composition of American society.

Add to this development the fact that the overwhelming majority of the bankrupt farming population driven off the

land to the cities and into industry are not foreign-born, but *native*. These Americans deserting the land and the individualistically organised agricultural economy are streaming into the basic monopolised industries organised on a social basis. It is true that the restrictive immigration legislation and the world war have proved potent factors for the development of a homogeneous working class in the United States. But this driving of the native farming masses into the industrial centres should prove an even stronger and more effective stimulus towards the development of a native, of a homogeneous proletariat. It has been conservatively estimated that within the last ten years no less than 6,500,000 have left the farms for the cities.

Once in the industries these native workers tend to assume a different social and political outlook. Their psychology as well as their economic status undergoes a process of thorough change. Not being skilled, as a rule, the proletarianised native farmers tend to drift into these industries that require heavy, semi-skilled and unskilled machine labour. Here they come into contact with the foreign-born workers massed in the basic industries. The inestimable political significance of this mass migration of native groups into the basic industries can be comprehended only when one considers the extent to which the foreign-born workers dominate the gainfully employed in the basic industries.

The foreign-born workers constitute seven-tenths of the bituminous coal mining operatives, do seven-eighths of all work in the woollen mills, supply nine-tenths of all labour in the cotton mills, make nineteen-twentieths of all the clothing, produce more than half the shoes, build four-fifths of all the furniture, refine about nine-twentieths of all the sugar, and compose at least sixty per cent. of all the steel workers. It is obvious that the introduction of great numbers of the less politically restricted (and more experienced in American political affairs) expropriated agricultural masses into this new economic environment is of a revolutionary meaning to the development of a native class conscious revolutionary working class.

When one further considers the extent to which recent years have seen the rapid rise of a powerful centralised government in the United States, he first becomes aware of the new, the post-war revolutionising factors making for the development of the class consciousness of the America proletariat. We need but examine the strike-breaking role of the government in the national textile, railway and coal strikes

of 1922 to get an idea of the brazenness, brutality and the frequency with which the American government throws in its full military, financial and judicial powers and resources on behalf of the bourgeoisie and against the proletariat in the class struggles in the United States.

In a subsequent article the writer proposes to deal with the marked trend toward the political radicalisation of the proletariat in the United States as a result of the new economic class alignments in American society. The America that the world knew before the imperialist war, before the Dawes' Plan, before the rise of a mighty centralised government apparatus, before the definite crystallisation of a big industrial proletariat, before the worst agricultural crisis in the history of the United States, is no more.

JAY LOVESTONE.



Revue des Revues

(“Socialist Review,” Organ of the Independent Labour Party of Great Britain)

THE British Labour Movement has always had a character quite its own. The comparatively small influence of Socialist ideas on the large British proletariat has always been a serious problem to Marxism. Of considerable methodological importance is the establishment—by means of an analysis of the British Labour movement—of a connection between the high level of the development of the productive forces of capitalism and the distinct class consciousness of the proletariat. Much thought was already given in the Second International to the question why British workers are so little affected by Socialist ideas, in spite of the fact that Great Britain is far ahead of other countries with respect to capitalist development. Frequently, no sufficient importance was given to the connection between economics and ideology. It was left out of account that the forms of the class struggle of the proletariat and the level of class consciousness are not the direct result of the conditions of production, but depend above all, on the conditions of life of the proletariat. In Great Britain, the classical country of bourgeois democratic domination, whose capitalist class had for decades the monopoly of the world market making surplus profits out of the exploitation of enormous colonies, the workers were better paid than in other European countries. This had a great deal to do with the shaping of the class struggle and with the moral and revolutionary development of the British proletariat. To a certain extent, this is so even to-day. Only lately, after the world war, and the great crises of world capitalism, when monopoly is slipping out of the hands of British capitalists, that one can observe in the British Labour movement, serious symptoms of the coming of a new era. And strange as it may seem, it is most probable that it will not be in Germany, the so to speak classical country of Socialism, that the proletariat will come decisively and class consciously to grips with capitalism, but in “backward” Great Britain, always a subject of derision from the Socialist viewpoint. It is here where the workers have the repu-

tation of being conservative and fettered by their traditional co-operative spirit that they are most likely to throw themselves steadfastly and energetically into the revolutionary struggle. That is why it is of the utmost importance to pay at the present juncture special attention to what is happening on the ideological front of the British Labour movement.

It is true that the "Socialist Review" (organ of the I.L.P.), which is the subject of this article, seems to be a remarkably helpless naive, and at the same time cunning production. But we must bear in mind that just as the German Social-Democratic Party, this most reactionary force in the German Labour movement, does not by any means reflect what is going on among the masses, so the I.L.P. cannot serve as a criterion to anyone who wants to form a judgment on the change which is taking place within the British working class. Just as the irony of fate that German Social-Democrats and German trade union leaders who for decades looked down on their British colleagues from the pinnacle of "their" Marxism are now compelled to carry on a struggle against some of the British trade union leaders who are from their viewpoint too Marxist and too revolutionary. I have in mind those representatives of the British trade unions who are paving the way to a rapprochement with the Russian Revolution and the Russian proletariat. German Social-Democrats fight virulently against this rapprochement, doing their utmost to prevent it. And thus it would seem that the leaders of the Independent Labour Party are much more to the right than many British trade union leaders.

As far back as 1908, when at the Session of the International Socialist Bureau in Brussels, the question of the admission of the Labour Party to the Second International was discussed, Lenin who attended the Session, gave a correct appreciation of the British Labour movement, and a correct characterisation of the leaders of the Independent Labour Party and of MacDonald. Lenin quotes Engels' letter to Sorge which describes the tactics of the British Social-Democratic Party with Hyndman at its head, as typically sectarian and erroneous in tactics in relation to the Labour Party. He says: "As far as there are objective conditions impeding the growth of the political consciousness and independence of the proletarian masses, one must be able to walk patiently and steadily side by side with these masses without making any concessions on questions of principle,

but also without eschewing work among the proletarian masses." "These lessons taught by Engels," Lenin went on to say, "found their justification in the process of the further development, when the British trade unions, in spite of their aristocratic-bourgeois selfishness and hostile attitude to Socialism came, although in an indirect and zig-zag manner, into touch with it. Only those who do not want to see, can be blind to the fact that Socialist ideas are rapidly getting hold of the British workers, that the Socialist movement in that country is already developing into a mass movement and that the moment for the social revolution in Great Britain is approaching." It is only now that we can properly appreciate this prophesy of Lenin. This is what Lenin says about the leaders of the Independent Labour Party: "There is no doubt about the opportunism of these people. For did not the leader of the Independent Labour Party, MacDonald, propose in Stuttgart to alter the second point of the statute of the International to the effect that the demand for the recognition of the principle of class struggle as an indispensable condition for admission into the International, should be replaced by 'bona fide.' "

Another leader of the Independent Labour Party whilst recounting his impressions of the Session of the International Socialist Bureau and the Brussels meeting, complains that at the meeting "hardly any emphasis was laid" on the ideological and ethical side of Socialism, which according to this leader is always given prominence at the meetings of the Independent Labour Party, whilst in Brussels "the soulless dogma of class struggle which cannot arouse any enthusiasm" predominated.

And this is how matters stand with the gentlemen of the Independent Labour Party even to-day. All their reasonings are very "ethical," very "humane," imbued with the "Christian" spirit and an enormous horror of the barbarous class war. And yet the leaders of the Independent Labour Party should learn something, even if it were from their own bourgeoisie! For the British bourgeoisie has a good notion of class struggle. It reasons frequently in a truly Marxist manner, although it has not studied Marxism from the works of Marx. Lenin was at the time astonished at Lloyd George's Marxism. And thus it happens that whilst Lloyd George, Chamberlain and Curzon talk straight and do not mince words, MacDonald and such like "Labour leaders" are continually referring to "humane-ness," "love of one's neighbour," "freedom," "democracy,"

etc. Not later than in the February number of the "Socialist Review," there is interesting material on British imperialism, on the position of the working class in Great Britain, and perfectly correct views on imperialism and democracy. But the British I.L.P.'ers do not know how to make a proper use of this material and these ideas, and make utterly erroneous deductions from perfectly correct premises, and this not because they lack logic, but a truly proletarian and revolutionary will. Speaking of parliamentarism, the anonymous writer in the February number of the "Socialist Review" points out that if things are to continue as before (in other words, if Mr. Thomas in his capacity of "Labour leader" and together with him, Chamberlain, will continue to deliver to the general satisfaction, meaningless speeches in the House of Commons) there would be the risk of the masses losing faith in the efficacy of parliament. He quotes Lord Morley who said: "The form of Government is far less important than the forces which are behind it." The article goes on to say that parliament is only an instrument, that it is important to the people only as far as it makes possible the transition of economic power from the hands of the minority into the hands of the people as a whole, for, it is further stated, "until the masses have economic power in their hands, they will not be free. All their freedom amounts only to electing a master to rule over them."

It would seem that there is a clear statement of fact, and one is led to expect deductions as clear. But we would look for them in vain. This is a country where as far back as the 18th century, William Pitt said: "The British Empire—is British trade," and Joseph Chamberlain, the father of the present Chamberlain, who is quoted on the pages of the "Socialist Review," said in his Birmingham speech in 1869: "All big governmental departments are concerned with questions of trade, the Foreign Office and the Colonial Office are first and foremost engaged in discovering new markets and protecting the old ones. The War Office and the Admiralty are mainly engaged in preparing the defence of these markets, and in protecting trade." And further: "It would not be an exaggeration to say that trade is the most important point in politics." It would seem that in a country where ministers posing as Socialists, hold such language, the leaders of the proletariat would also acquire a realistic and at the same time revolutionary form of thought. Nothing of the kind! Whilst the representatives and leaders of the British bourgeoisie are first class "real politiker," the leaders of the Independent Labour Party are "nondes-

script idealists" to the detriment of revolutionary clarity which is so essential to the proletariat.

We heard already from their lips an appreciation of parliamentarism. Let us see now what a leader of the right-wing—Clynes—has to say on this subject. In a speech delivered recently in London at the banquet of the Clerk's Union, he said: "One cannot bring about a change by violence. In a country where 20,000,000 men and women possess the vote, it is out of the question to talk and think of violence. All the people, be they Conservatives, Liberals or workers, are for democratic principles, they elect their representatives into Parliament and accept their decisions as the will of the people." And this from the lips of a "Labour leader," and that after the recent general election in Great Britain which has given ascendance to the worst enemy of the proletariat and peace—the Conservative Party! Do the "decisions" of this Party really represent the "will of the people" to Mr. Clynes?

The anonymous writer of the article published in the February number gives an interesting picture of the position of the working class. It points out among other things that in 1921 73.3 million pounds sterling were again sunk into the enterprises in Great Britain and 112.7 million pounds sterling into the British enterprises abroad. Side by side with this the total sum representing decrease of wages amounted to £6,026,000 per week. In 1922, £73.8 million were put into circulation in Great Britain and £130.1 million abroad. The total amount representing wages again decreased to £4,211,000 per week. "During this period (since 1900), says the writer of the article, "the territory of the British Empire increased by 2,000,000 British square miles, its population went up from 390 to 449 millions, whilst trade increased from 1,467 millions in 1921 to 3,927 millions in 1922." Capital is flourishing, whilst the workers have a hard time of it. Concentration of capital made enormous progress during that time. There is for instance, the first "Guest, Keen and Nettlefold," in the cast-iron, steel and coal industries. In 1914 the capital of this firm amounted to £6,457,000 and the profit to £401,722; in 1923 the capital increased to £17,630,000 and the profit to £844,919. The Nobel Company had in 1920 a clear profit of £788,807; in 1923, £1,032,489. Very interesting are the statistics showing how many days were lost per year per head of the industrial population in the period 1908-1923: as a result of strikes,

2.11 ; as a result of unemployment, 18.66. During the world war 574,354 industrial workers were killed and 678,896 were wounded, and who profited by it? Who was benefited by these enormous sacrifices? Only financiers, says the writer of the article. Quite so, you say to him, but what is the deduction from it? Where is the revolutionary attitude to these facts? One should not look for them in this article.

In another part of the article colonies are mentioned. In 1756, when Clive went to India, the national debt amounted to £74,775,000, and the interest on it was £2,753,000. By 1815 the debt went up to £861,000,000, and the yearly interest to £32,645,000. And the culprit was India. You probably suppose that the writer of the article advocates its independence? Nothing of the kind. He says: "To obtain the liberation of the British colonies, would be tantamount to handing them over to the exploitation by the capitalists of other countries. On the other hand, being in favour of preserving these colonies for Great Britain, we, by this very fact, endorse to a certain extent capitalist policy with all the perils which lurk behind it. It is self-evident that every kind of commercial enterprise is connected with a certain amount of risk. Consequently, we are accepting some risk (namely, we calmly continue to retain the colonies)." Is not this characteristic for the political physiognomy of the I.L.P.'ers? They quote British bourgeois statesmen. They show that parliamentarism is a useless toy, and that the economic forces behind parliament are ruining the country. The importance of the colonies and their exploitation are correctly appreciated. But when it comes to deductions, it becomes apparent that instead of a real struggle they subscribe wholeheartedly to the existing state of affairs, and are prepared to exploit colonies side by side with the capitalists, depriving thereby the British proletariat of the real basis for the struggle against the British imperialism.

Not a word is said about class struggle. Three leaders of the Labour Party—MacDonald, Clynes and Thomas—are rather aptly characterised by the author. Of MacDonald he says: "MacDonald cannot accept the idea of a sudden change which seemingly has no connection with the past. MacDonald is a man who can be at the head of a movement after a big social change; he is not a person to play a guiding role in the revolution." Of course, not! For have we seen Mr. MacDonald at work! Clynes' notion of the tasks of a Labour leader is clear from his above-quoted speech.

Of Mr. Thomas the writer of the article says : "He is not a Socialist, and treats with contempt all talk of class struggle. When necessary, he can make a speech without saying anything." But there are also speeches in which he does say something. Such a speech he made on April 4th at a banquet given in honour of the Western Railway Company over which Churchill presided. Among those present were also Mr. Baldwin, and "the Labour leader," Thomas. So you see the company was select ! And this is what Thomas said in his speech : "In our times there is much talk about class hatred and class exasperation ; about the domination of some classes over others. Far from subscribing to all this, I thoroughly condemn all this talk. I began my career as a conductor on the Western Railway, and was paid seven shillings a week. It is true that I had occasion to lead a strike, but our demand was not for higher wages, but for more tallow to clean the engines with." And then again : "A week ago I was speaking in Glasgow, where a gentleman, in moving his resolution, declared everyone who went with Baldwin, was a traitor to his class. The next speaker after him was I. I began my speech as follows : "I confess that I myself am such a traitor to my class."

After such words is any further characterisation of this "Labour leader" needed ?

What then are the deductions which the writer of this article makes after his, on the whole, correct characteristic of the three "Labour leaders?" It would seem that the writer is perfectly satisfied with his leaders. The aim which he pursues can be achieved even under their leadership. The growing acuteness of the class struggle in Great Britain, the pauperisation of the masses is bound to drive large sections of the British proletariat to the Left. Thus, by publishing their periodical, the gentlemen of the Independent Labour Party have set themselves the task to act rather cunningly, and not to deny the facts which are evident to all, in order to save appearances. But practically they do everything to divert from a truly revolutionary struggle. Thus, for instance, the January number contains the following statement : "Foreign politics are nothing but a romantic illusion. We talk of nations, honour, war, and peace, and such like matters with astounding seriousness. And in the meantime, all of us, including even foreign secretaries, are marionettes whose strings are pulled by the powerful finance and trade capital. When capitalists quarrel among each other, nations fight at their bidding. When they make peace—peoples

enjoy peace. And we are naive enough to believe that the time of eternal peace has come." The same article goes on to say: "Violence is at present the dominating factor in world politics. The development of the productivity of big industrial nations will only give an impetus to the struggle for markets. Competition is growing and will have its effect on the policy of various governments. Far from diminishing, the world war has increased the appetites of capitalism."

And here again we say: How true and how correct! But what about the programme and the tactics of the British Labour Party? The answer to this question are the speeches of Messrs Clynes and Thomas, the affairs of Mr. MacDonald and the deductions of the writers of the various articles in the "Socialist Review," on the position of the working class in Great Britain, on the economic situation of British Imperialism. And regardless of the multiplicity of quotations from truly "Marxist" speeches by British statesmen to whom humaneness, idealism, etc., are nothing, and profits exploitation, colonial robbery, etc., are everything, we must not expect correct deductions from these facts, from the leaders of the Independent Labour Party, and the writers of the "Socialist Review." These deductions will be made by the British proletariat itself. British workers will learn much from the Lloyd Georges and Chamberlains. As to the Liberal and bewildering chatter of the I.L.P.'ers, the proletariat will know how to do without it.

MALETSKY.

On “The Dishonest Book” of the English Delegation and the “Honest” Criticism of Friedrich Adler

(“Kampf,” April, 1925. “Sotsialisticheski Vestnik,”
Nos. 99 and 100)

THE book of the British Trade Union Delegation has had good luck. It has been fated to make a whole epoch, for it is the first non-Communist Labour book which correctly describes what the delegates saw in Soviet Russia. Up to now, the reformist working masses of the West have been compelled to fall back on the various descriptions of the “fantastic journeys” which their fearless leaders accomplished at the utmost danger to their lives—lives so necessary to the working class. In the pre-stabilisation epoch, in the period of the rise of the proletarian wave, there have been quite a number of these “tourists” in Soviet Moscow. The well-known Mrs. Snowden, the anarcho-Tolstoyans, Sukhi and Emma Goldman, the “independent” Social-Democrats, Ditmann and Crispien, and a whole pleiade of others came to Russia in 1920-21, into the very “lair of the dictatorship”—and they presented the most respected public with such a bouquet of spicy boulevard stories and “warranted anecdotes” as would have made any yellow Paris reporter turn green with envy.

In those days, this “literature” did not arouse any doubts, not a single Fritz Adler, not a single voice of protest rose from the ranks of the Second International. However, even before the publication of the British Delegation’s report, and not yet knowing its contents, the Menshevik press of the whole world endeavoured to “preventatively” discredit and dispraise it in advance. A wild hue and cry was raised against the British Delegation, whose declarations—according to a statement of Fritz Adler at the Conference of the E.C.’s of the Second and Amsterdam International in Brussels (January, 1925)—“were a threat to the fundamental principals of the Socialist International.” And as soon as the book appeared, it was at once branded as “dishonest.”

Henceforward, every worker who thinks of going to Soviet Russia and describing to his comrades what he has actually seen in the Workers' and Peasants' Republic, should first of all apply to the editor of the "Sotsialistcheskivestnik" demanding a mandate for "honesty." H. N. Brailsford, editor of the *New Leader*, writing in his journal in "justification" of the Delegation, says: "This book is a product of sincere and honest work." The Delegation of Belgian Garment Workers who visited Soviet Russia in February of this year, and who published in the Belgian trade union press an admirable formal report on the position of the workers in the U.S.S.R., makes in its concluding remarks the following characteristic declaration: "When we bade farewell to our Russian comrades. . . they asked us to tell the Belgian workers the *whole truth* as to what we had seen and heard in Soviet Russia—both the *good* and the *bad*. We believe that in our report we have observed this elementary *honesty*."

And the more these workers' delegations visit Soviet Russia, and with their own eyes become convinced of the tremendous creative work that the Russian proletariat has accomplished during the years of the revolution, the more they dare to share their impressions with their comrades, the more acute will become the hate towards Soviet Russia on the part of the leaders of international reformism, and the more vehemently will they attack any objective presentation of facts. It is not without cause that the "Sotsialisticheski Vestnik" described the British report as "the most false document on Bolshevik experience in Russia," and Friedrich Adler—the embodiment of the "conscience" of the Second International, says that "since the time of the war excesses of the German Social-imperialists, not a single book has caused such indignation by the baseness of its forms of expression and shamelessness of its frankness, as this "report." This means that the shot has hit its mark! Relations with Soviet Russia have been the acid test over which no few "scrupulous" Centrist-Reformist leaders have tripped themselves up.

The report of the British Delegation takes the facts about Russia as they are. This has aroused the highest indignation and "demolishing" criticism on the part of Friedrich Adler. "The object of this report," as it says in the introduction, "is to review the advantages and disadvantages accruing to the people of Russia under the new system of government. . . a political system can be judged best by its results" . . . and the British Delegation, who are very far from being Communists, impartially assert that

the Russian workers are the ruling class in Russia"; that "the workers enjoy the rights of the ruling class"; that "democracy," as understood elsewhere, has no place here"; that "the leaders of the social-revolutionaries and Mensheviks are too incensed to be able to expect anything from them in the future." Such methods of exposing facts far from pleases Friedrich Adler; indeed, can we really talk about such minor details as "results" when "we are threatened with losing the greatest thing we have—the honour of the Labour movement." After all, as if we could compare for the working class, the results of the dictatorship of a "band of usurpers," under whom, according to the testimony of the British Delegation, "the workers enjoy the rights of the ruling class" as if we could compare this with those brilliant results that the Austrian proletariat have attained under the superb and remarkable leadership of Adler & Co.! Feeling all the hopelessness of his position in face of facts, Adler transfers the discussion entirely into the sphere of metaphysics. It is characteristic that it is the so-called "lefts" of the Second International, who are leading the entire "ideological" attack against the British Delegation. The practical leaders are too busy with their everyday Barmat affairs. They are looking after the "results," while they leave Adler to guard the "honour of the Labour movement."

In order more fully to discredit the report, Adler tries to bring up something against its author. After the "Sots. Vestnik" discovered that the report is a "conscious deception," on the part of the English Delegation, Adler endeavours to picture the members of the British Delegation as "simple fellows" who hastily signed the document without looking at it, directly the ex-officials of the British government shoved it under their noses. "Who are the authors of the reports?" insinuates Adler. In actuality it was written by three "information experts" that the Delegation took with them. In reading this report, the reader must never forget: "the prestige of the British trade unions, and the routine and way of thinking of the paid cast-off officials of the British diplomatic service". . . . We might remind the secretary of the Second International, Adler, that among the members of the British Delegation were the responsible members of the Second International, Purcell and Bromley, *unanimously* elected in June, 1924, in Vienna, to responsible posts of President and Second Member of the Presidium of the Amsterdam International of Trade Unions. We know, of course, that it is true that members of the Second and Amsterdam International very often do sign documents "without looking at them" (war budgets for instance, or documents on Labour organisations, on the "Special Powers

Act," on the "patriotic" refusal, on the eight-hour working day). But these are all in respect to the bourgeoisie. It is quite a different matter where it is a question of "terrorist seizers of power," of saving the "honour of the Labour movement!" Furthermore, won't the impression be made still more favourable by the depositions of the two ex-officials of the Foreign Office, who are only engaged in order to be independent of Soviet translators!

Why did these people have to have recourse to all this? The secret is not far to see. At any price they had to damage the cause of international trade union unity. As everyone knows, every time the reformists do something particularly dirty, they begin beating themselves on the breast and howling about their "honesty." One by one, working class delegations are being attracted to Soviet Russia—Belgians, Swedes, Englishmen. "The working masses want to convince themselves," write the Belgian Garment Workers in their report—"as to whether the trade union movement really exists in Soviet Russia, as to whether the workers really carry on affairs there *themselves*, as to whether they really enjoy there a larger or smaller number of rights and liberties than we do, or, in one word, what are the palpable results of the October revolution of the proletariat." The workers want to test Adler's spectacles. And the result is always the same. "The factory committee is the direct protector of the workers' interests in the factory," write the Belgians. "It must not be thought that the Communists enjoy favoured conditions at all in the factories. In general it is not easy by far to be a Communist in Russia. Both in the economic and the political life there is complete equality of sex. On the outskirts of Moscow we have seen palaces which at one time belong to princes, transformed now into rest homes and sanatoriums. Private owners, temporarily tolerated in Russia, are not the proprietors as we know them in capitalist countries. They have to obey the workers' legislation, to observe the entire Soviet law in general" . . . and as they say in the conclusion: "the victory of the proletariat depends upon unity."

Such reports as this are enough to drive any Adler to fury. And the artillery fire of the "reserved English gentlemen" has above all the aim of creating a smoke curtain which would hide from the eyes of the European proletarians the true picture of things, and would weaken the impression of the British report. The allusions to "honour" and "morals" are provoked by motives very far from such high callings.

Friend Fredericus, don't talk so prettily!

G. SMOLIANSKY.

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